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# West Europe Report

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**LAMBSDORFF DISCUSSES OIL CRISIS, INFLATION, WORLD ECONOMY**

Caracas EL UNIVERSAL in Spanish 19 Aug 79 Sec 1 p 24

/Speech by FRG Minister of Economy Otto Graf Lambsdorff to the German-Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce in Venezuela; date not given/

/Text/ A new inflationary surge will unsettle economies throughout the world, said FRG Minister of Economy Otto Graf Lambsdorff in a speech to the German-Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce. Following are some of the remarks made by Minister Graf Lambsdorff:

For my part, as I stand here in Venezuela, one of the large oil exporters and distinguished member of OPEC, I would like to speak about an energy policy and its importance to the international economy.

In my opinion, the development of energy markets basically gives rise to two types of economic policy.

Over the short-term, petroleum consumers must face the unexpected burdens imposed by the Iranian crisis, the development of prices in "spot" markets and price increases dictated by OPEC member nations.

Over the medium- and long-term it is important to ameliorate the effects that the predicted shortages, particularly with respect to oil, for the mid to late 1980's are having now. Therefore, we must assume that there is less time than was thought several years ago to make the necessary adjustments to the changing energy markets situation.

These developments in the petroleum market are also affecting the world economy at a time of transition during a period of instability.

Because in recent years most of the economies throughout the world have gone through considerable changes in basic economic conditions.

I would like to remind you of:

--The problems of inflation which continued unresolved in many countries and the struggles for distribution of this product.

- The new channeling of revenue sources as a result of the petroleum price explosion.
- The changes in the monetary structure and the expansion of the Eurodollar markets.
- The beginnings of a new international division of labor between the "old" industrial nations and those nation's that are becoming industrialized because of their vigorous development especially in the industrial sector area of mass produced simple products.

Adapting to these new conditions and/or the surmounting of this situation will also be a challenge for the industrialized nations. Dislocations in production, in the labor market or in loan balances are very common in the world economy.

The result is that protectionist action is more pronounced in industrialized and developing nations.

With this for a backdrop, the demands for the creation of a new international economic order proposed by the developing nations must be taken into account. As is to be expected, there are differences from country to country. Some are striking.

OPEC member nations and the other oil exporting nations are actually in a position where they can arrange production shortages as well as, to a great extent, agree to control the supply.

However, this should not lead them to think, based on this favorable position, that they can forget about the satisfactory operation of the world economy.

Because if the large industrial countries of the world do not manage to adapt to the new basic international economic conditions--and OPEC's recent price decisions unquestionably are making this difficult--not only will those directly affected suffer the consequences but OPEC will also feel the repercussions.

In view of OPEC's recent pricing decisions, I do not feel that this has always been the case.

Because the immediate result of the recent oil price developments will be a new inflationary spiral that will shake economies throughout the world.

The most dangerous aspect of this situation is the secondary effects which will be in the form of salary and price increases which cannot be avoided worldwide.

In addition, in numerous industrial and developing nations the balance of payments problem will become worse.

But above all there is a risk of endangering again the growth process which was reinitiated so painfully.

Thus the unemployment problem throughout the world might become worse. With mounting economic problems, the danger of increased protectionists policies will grow throughout the world.

That is why Tokyo deplored the decision of the OPEC member nations. That is why Tokyo stressed that the problems affecting the world economy can only be solved through a spirit of shared responsibility and "partnership."

At the present time the major burdens are making more difficult the developing nations' prospects for growth.

Over an even longer period of time, the situation will become worse because in those nations that are now becoming industrialized energy consumption will increase more than in the already industrialized nations.

Recent developments in the petroleum markets were not entirely unforeseen. Because all long-term estimates indicated, and they continue to do so, that there would be permanent shortages in the petroleum markets.

But if economic principles are still viable, this naturally also means that there will be a relative price increase and not, as sometimes occurred in the past, a relative decrease.

If we trust in market forces, the price structure could at any given moment automatically and gradually be pegged to the present shortages and also to those forecast for the future. Which, of course, presupposes that there is competition between the demand and the supply. But if, on the contrary, there is confidence, as OPEC believes, that there will be an international agreement to determine supply or set prices, there is no question that the problem will be more difficult to solve.

As for the energy and oil problem, it is the responsibility of all partners in the world economy alike. We are all on the same ship--but of course we all have different roles. We must avoid being shipwrecked. The problem lies in knowing what role belongs to whom.

Please excuse my courtesy when I talk about OPEC's responsibility. The petroleum exporting countries should above all make an effort to see that the development of the petroleum sector occurs without producing large-scale dislocations.

Artificially contrived shortages at specific times alter world economic growth and hinder the integration of those countries into the world economy. This is not in the best interest of oil consuming nations nor of the petroleum exporting nations--especially if we are dealing with the more advanced developing countries with vigorous industrialization programs.

These countries are the ones looking for markets for their products. But they will be able to find them only if international growth occurs with a minimum amount of friction. Specifically, this means that:

--First, it is essential that oil consumers be provided with a highly durable and uninterrupted supply in the necessary quantities, with the progressive adjustment of the supply to the gradual decline in world petroleum reserves.

--Second, it is important to avoid sudden price increases in the future.

Instead, in our opinion, efforts should be made to secure a new policy of constant price adjustments in keeping with the shortages as they occur. Price increases alter the process of adapting the international economy to the new energy situation as do the artificially contrived shortages, especially when they lead to the resurgence of inflation in industrial nations. Developments since 1973-1974 set an eloquent example and are educational. Throughout the world efforts were made to counteract the major and rapid transfer of resources to exporting petroleum nations as a result of the increase in oil prices. Ultimately, this led to a rapid worldwide inflationary spiral.

The result was international recession. For OPEC it meant that the "terms of trade" became perceptibly worse. OPEC member nations who had accumulated large foreign currency reserves and financial assets were forced to watch their sharp devaluation. Other OPEC member nations with industrial development plans were forced to alter them considerably. For this reason also it is more important for OPEC to have long-term success rather than merely take short-term advantage of market conditions.

--Third, some countries accumulated large foreign currency reserves and they continue to do so because of the financial fluctuations arising out of the changes in oil prices.

It is essential that these reserves be channelled towards more reasonable forms of investments. It would be a fatal mistake to allow these reserves to be converted from one currency to another. The entire monetary structure would be seriously altered not only in detriment to petroleum consumers but also, unquestionably, to those responsible for the dislocations. Also in this respect we have past experiences to look back upon.

Just as important as it is for OPEC to meet its responsibility, the oil consumers must fulfill their commitments. Over the short-term the task consists of facing the immediate burdens arising out of the recent price developments on the oil markets and to prevent changes in the world economy such as those of the recent past (1973-1974).

Then as now, for those of us in the FRG the solution has not been to respond to OPEC's decision by fueling inflation. We are happy to see that this viewpoint was adopted in other parts of the world. At least in Toyko we reached agreement on that point. It is a matter of making the necessary transfer of resources to the oil exporting nations. This naturally means that repercussions from oil price increases will be felt by the consumers. But we must oppose all price increases that go beyond this.

In any case it is necessary to prevent a secondary impact from inflation.

Over the medium- and long-term, the industrial nations' principal responsibility lies in their adapting to the new energy situation--action that should not be postponed. On the contrary, consumer nations should begin implementing or intensifying this policy immediately.

In this matter the following four points should be stressed:

- save energy, especially oil
- promote exploration for new oil deposits
- promote substitute sources of energy
- promote new sources of energy that to date have not been profitable

In this respect industrial nations have clearly expressed their willingness to do so, as you all know.

At this time it is important to put into practice the measures adopted by the European Community and the International Economic Summit.

8599  
CSJ: 3010

## PROBLEMS IN GREEK-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS NOTED

Cologne RHEINISCHER MERKUR in German 17 Aug 79 p 5

[Article by Gregor Manousakis: "Trouble Between Friends"]

[Text] In Athens business circles, the talk is above all about a tiff between Greece and the FRG. There are over 1 million Greeks with at least 3 years of first-hand knowledge of Germany. Thus, one out of every nine Greeks knows Germany from personal experience. These people are not only guest workers: Over 15,000 Greeks have gone through universities there just since the end of World War II. Moreover, in Athens alone the German colony numbers about 6,000 people. Living here are not only German women who are married to Greeks but also German men who have taken Greek wives. Not counted in this are those young people who hire out as illegal guest workers. For example, there are travel agencies whose employees disguise themselves as crew members on yachts. Also belonging to this category are babysitters and domestic servants.

But not only from this point of view are German-Greek relations important. With exports to Greece valued at around DM 2 billion, the FRG's share in total Greek imports amounts to over 15 percent. Italy follows with only approximately 8 percent. Thus Germany is by far the largest supplier of Greece. Conversely however, the FRG also purchases from it goods valued at more than DM 1.2 billion, which amounts to over 22 percent of all Greek exports (Italy is second with around 10 percent). Moreover, from 1954 to 1978 Bonn furnished to Greece over DM 780 million in capital aid. To this can be added DM 57 million in technical aid as well as an additional 305 million European Units of Account (EUA) within the framework of the first and second "financial protocols" of the EC.

The military aid supplied to Greece within the framework of NATO between 1964 and 1978 amounts to DM 220 million. Not counted in this is the military aid which Greece has received from the FRG free of charge since 1964. Accordingly, Greek-German relations rest on a solid foundation. They could have been cloudless. But certain difficulties

have recently emerged from behind the scenes. Following the process of redemocratization, those Greeks whose resistance to the Athens junta had been supported at that time by the DGB [German Labor Union Federation] came to regard themselves as a German party too, so to speak--in particular as a branch of the SPD in their country.

Following the arrest of the terrorist Rolf Pohle and in the course of his trial, these people had misled and pressured the Greek government to such an extent that it had seriously considered refusing Bonn's extradition request. Adamant German intermediation and the tough-minded intervention of the Areios Pagos--the supreme cassation court of this country--were finally able to save the honor of the Greek judicature, which in the first instance court had ruled that such a Rolf Pohle had "political motives" for his criminal acts.

The then German ambassador to Athens, Oncken, displayed a very deft hand in this connection. However, during the term of office of his successor Poensgen, new problems surfaced. The Greek government began to show favor to France in the awarding of government contracts. It is rumored that bids for international competitions are being invited which allegedly were already decided in favor of France long beforehand. Notwithstanding this, rumor has it that Paris has offered an export credit of \$50 million to Greece at not exactly easy terms. It is said that now the government in Athens is exerting gentle pressure on the Greek industrialists to get them to import capital goods from France with the aid of this loan.

On the other hand, the FRG has not obtained any large contracts from Greece recently, aside from the construction of the Athens Metro. Even in opposition circles in Athens, this development is not attributed solely to the good relations between Karamanlis and France. Ambassador Poensgen is considered to be out of touch. Business circles in Athens who still remember well the receptiveness of former Ambassador Oncken and his manifold contacts speak of a "self-isolation."

Last May, it was suddenly reported that Greek national television had decided in favor of the French SECAM system [sequentielle a memoire: a color television system]. A few days later, Ambassador Poensgen was called home. Ostensibly, he is to become ambassador for special missions now. Thus, at the present time Poensgen's post is a de-facto vacant post. Moreover, it is interesting to note that meanwhile the original decision in favor of the SECAM system has again been nullified. It is now being said that the government wants to reexamine the situation in this area.

12114  
CSO: 3103

## NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF INTERVIEWED ON NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY

Stuttgart MARINE-RUNDSCHAU in English Aug 79 pp 479-485

[Interview with Navy Chief of Staff by Hannajoerg Kowak, date and place not given]

[Text]

K.: Since its reorganization after World War II the Belgian Navy has achieved a remarkable state of readiness, particularly during the 1970's. How do you explain this and what missions have been assigned to your Navy within the scope of your national defence policy?

v. D.: Supported by the British and from the 1950's on also by the Americans we embarked soon after World War II on the reorganization and re-establishment of our Navy consisting at the time almost exclusively of highly specialized mine warfare units employed as escorts for protecting other vessels against enemy submarines and surface ships. They could also be used as minesweepers. Incidentally, I, myself, served on board one of these ships during the war. The missions of the new Belgian Navy were described in a royal decree charging it with the protection of our coast lines and merchant vessels as well as with mine countermeasures off the Belgian coast, these tasks having ever since remained the same as before. With the replacement of the *Algerine* class built during the war becoming more and more urgent my predecessor received orders from the government to embark on the design and development of four new frigates which were to be commissioned in 1980. Since the new ships on account of their draught could only enter and leave our main naval base at Ostend when the tide was up, the construction of a new access to the sea independent of the change of tide became indispensable. We, therefore, decided to establish a completely new naval base at Zeebrugge which is now under construction and includes all the infrastructure and facilities required for our frigates. Furthermore, the new base will allow for a general reorganization of all our naval bases so far dispersed over the whole of our coast line, the re-organization also rendering the use of the base more profitable

We will transfer the whole infrastructure of the Belgian Navy to Zeebrugge in the near future. From 1980 on the Belgian Naval Command with its headquarters still at Ostend as well as the frigates and minehunters will be stationed at Zeebrugge. Only our small minehunters will remain at Ostend. As you know, we have also been participating in the trinational minehunter programme established in addition to the frigate programme. The minehunter programme includes France, Holland, and Belgium and provides for 10 units to be built by our country. However, since these new minehunters of the *Eridan* type can only operate under certain maritime conditions we will start another minehunter programme of conventional design after the conclusion of the present programme in 1986.

K.: What is the role of the Belgian Navy within NATO?

v. D.: Within NATO the Belgian Navy plays almost the same part as within our national defence programme, i. e. it has the mission of protecting merchant vessels, carrying out tasks within the scope of mine warfare and is charged with naval control of shipping. In contrast to our national defence mission, however, the Navy's zone of operation will not be restricted to the marginal sea area directly off the Belgian coast. All over the years we have been asked in NATO conferences at what time the Belgian Navy will have developed a capability of contributing to the protection of mercantile shipping against the growing submarine threat. With our frigate programme accomplished the situation has changed. In the future our frigates will mainly operate in both the Channel and the North Sea but they can also be employed in the Atlantic. This type of ships is fully ocean-going and has a capability of remaining in the Atlantic for several weeks. From the spring of 1980 on the Belgian Navy will regularly assign one of its frigates to *STANAVFORLANT* for a period of 5 to 6 months every year, this representing a 50 per cent presence as compared to the German Federal Navy.

K.: So far the Belgian sailors have exclusively been trained for mine warfare and are but little familiar with the weapons and propulsion systems of frigates. I guess that this must have led to considerable difficulties as far as the personnel sector is concerned. Were you able to overcome these difficulties and to what degree?

v. D.: We had a lot of difficulties and problems. When in 1973 the planning phase was concluded and when our decision for certain systems was taken we immediately began with a deliberate training of our crews. That is, we had already in 1973 organized our crews and taken up special training. Artillery officers, for instance, were already at that time ordered to attend a course in missile training. Likewise all our technical personnel attended courses in weapons, propulsion, and trans-

mission systems in those countries where the respective systems were produced. Thus we were capable of achieving a fair state of training in advance. But we will still have problems if one of these highly specialized officers should be incapacitated though, for the time being, it does not appear probable. It is, however, important to maintain this standard of training with all future crews, for our present crews were already on board when the ships were still under construction. In accordance with their respective special training the members of the crews thus had an opportunity to pursue the completion of their ships one year ahead of their testing phase which is indispensable regarding the comprehension of the various systems and their use. The same crew has been on the same frigate for 1 to 2 years at sea. After a period of 2½ years on board it is now time to replace them in order to train the next crew on board this type of ship. In some of the fields of training we have been closely cooperating with the Dutch Navy. We are for instance, sending officers to attend training courses at Den Helder because we are not in a position to do so in this country for lack of training facilities. We will, therefore, send our crews as far as possible to attend training courses in France or in the Netherlands; the results achieved by this training procedure can be considered satisfactory so far.

K.: Is the fluctuation of personnel on board the new frigates smaller than on board other vessels?

v. D.: No, it is not. Generally, we can say that we only train personnel on board Belgian ships who are fit for this kind of service. After a training course extending over a period of 6 to 7 months the rank and file are assigned to their respective units where they will do service afloat for about two years. After this time they will rotate regularly between duty on board and duty on shore. With the non-commissioned and commissioned officers duty on shore prevails with their growing age and/or higher rank. The same rhythm will be maintained with regard to frigate crews. For the time being we are still capable of retaining this system but we have a personnel problem, indeed, with only 4450 officers and men serving in the Navy. They just suffice to man our mine warfare force, considering the personnel infrastructure necessary on shore and those who have become unfit for duty on board. With the personnel of the four new frigates we will have exhausted our possibilities, and the personnel question will stand in the fore-ground of all our future deliberations.

K.: The frigates are equipped with a multitude of foreign weapons and electronic systems. Has this multitude of companies who took part in the design of these vessels not led to considerable problems?

v. D.: Of course, it has, but we have the advantage of most systems being of French origin, the American SEA-SPARROW excepted. A decision concerning the close-defence system has not been taken yet, but we will probably take it in favour of a NATO system. As far as we have dealt with French equipment we have not encountered any problems until now. All sensors and the fire direction sponsons are of Dutch origin.

The problem of the »Interface« system led, indeed, to some difficulties which, however, could largely be overcome.

K.: The four frigates will, of course, be commissioned successively, when, do you think, will this be?

v. D.: For the time being all of the four frigates are still being tested. After this phase and the integration of all weapon-systems the frigates will start their operational training. This phase contains joint exercises with units of the Royal Dutch Navy and the »Basic Operational Sea Training« at Portland. This phase of operational training concluded in 1980 the first frigate can be assigned to STANAVFORLANT, the second be attached to the Royal Dutch Squadron. The third unit will then be committed within the scope of our national programmes, whereas the fourth unit will undergo a dockyard period at Den Helder and another period dedicated to the revision of her weapons systems at Brest. This implies that the Belgian Navy will only have three frigates operational while the fourth frigate will undergo her dockyard period with 75 per cent of her crew.

K.: Admiral, are you satisfied with this new type of frigate with regard to its present state of testing and have all expectations set in this ship class been met?

v. D.: Yes, absolutely. We are very much satisfied.

K.: Are you planning to build more frigates of this type?

v. D.: We are not so far; our ten-year plan agreed upon by the three branches of our armed forces on a ministerial level only provides for four frigates for the Navy, and the forthcoming ten years till 1990 are already stuffed with the tri-national minehunter programme, so we can only think of it after the completion of this programme.

K.: Another interesting project of the Belgian Navy is the participation in the »Chasseur de Mines Tripartite« (trinational minehunter) programme. Belgium decided to build ten units of this type which are to be delivered between 1982 and 1986. In what dockyards will these vessels be built?

v. D.: We are still negotiating with the various dockyards without having signed a contract so far, but we firmly count on doing so in September/October. Belgium has 9 dockyards capable of realizing this programme, and it is absolutely possible that they will establish a working group. As soon as the orders will have been placed the companies in question have to establish the necessary infrastructure which will take about a year. So they cannot start building the ships before late 1981.

K.: Are the names of the ten minehunters already known?

v. D.: Since the orders are not placed yet we postpone the naming for the time being. But we suppose that the names of a former minesweeper class (type MSC *Bluebird*) named after cities according to an old tradition will be taken over.

K.: Do you have observers at Lorient who observe the construction of the French prototype?

v. D.: Yes, we have a liaison officer in Paris and a few naval engineers at Lorient who observe the progress of the construction work of the prototype.

K.: How do you assess the mine threat in the Channel, Admiral?

v. D.: The present mine threat is big and constantly growing since this sea area offers the best possibilities for mine warfare you can imagine. The mine is a cheap weapon though sophisticated as far as its system is concerned but it can easily be laid to neutralize the whole of the shipping traffic. Even before the outbreak of hostilities mines can be laid by airplanes or submarines in this region. We know that the Soviet Navy has an enormous arsenal of mines representing a dangerous threat despite our endeavours to optimize mine warfare and mine systems. Of course, the Soviet Navy also has mines for defensive purposes but of the hundred thousands of mines stockpiled in Soviet arsenals 50 per cent, for sure, are planned for offensive use. It is obvious that the neuralgic Channel zone through which all our supplies for the maintenance of our military resistance pass will be exposed to a particular threat that should not be underestimated. If the Soviets succeed in blocking this sea area the NATO members will find themselves in an extremely critical situation.

K.: Do you think it necessary to further reinforce the mine warfare forces?

v. D.: Absolutely. We know, of course, very well that the units we will have after the completion of the present programme will not suffice. But there are narrow limits to our planning drawn by our financial possibilities. Originally we asked for 15 minehunters ten of which were approved by the government, though, and we have an option to 5 more units; if the necessary financial means can be allotted at a later date.

K.: According to a decision taken in 1974 the Belgian Army is going to be converted into an army composed of career soldiers by augmenting the number of volunteers and, simultaneously, reducing that of the conscripts. At the same time conscription is said to be reduced from 15 to 6 months. Do you believe that a conscript can be trained for duty on board within such a short period of time? Will a recruit with this kind of training be of any use on board a modern frigate?

v. D.: In this case we would actually be faced with another difficulty since of six months of service there would hardly be any time left after a two-month elementary training period. But you should not forget that due to the new law the number of conscripts would decrease in favour of more volunteers. In future we will see to it that out of the conscripts joining

the armed forces in spring and autumn only those are selected who have already civilian occupational specialities such as mechanics, cooks, waiters, electricians a.s.f. The latter should primarily serve on board minesweepers. There is hardly any use for them on board the frigates on account of the ships being often more than 6 months at sea, let alone the specialization of their crews. From a military point of view it would have made more sense to abolish conscription and establish armed forces exclusively consisting of volunteers, but this was not accepted for political reasons. Now we have the disadvantage that we have both conscripts and career soldiers.

K.: How many conscripts are now on duty on board the frigates?

v. K.: Approximately twenty.

K.: Does the Belgian Navy have recruiting problems?

v. D.: Yes, we have them, but contingent upon the strict physical fitness tests. A large number of the volunteers willing to join the Navy cannot be selected due to some physical deficiency, but, nevertheless, we have been able to nearly fill our personnel gaps.

K.: There has a discussion been going on for some years concerning the socialization of the armed forces, i.e. the assimilation of military organizations to civilian ones. Is there a similar process in Belgium?

v. K.: Yes, there is. We have, for instance, regular soldiers in all branches and services as representatives of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers as well as the soldiers, who register all problems and wishes arising within the armed forces and submit them to the Chief of the Admiral- or General Staff from time to time. There are no difficulties whatsoever in this respect. But there are actually problems arising from legal syndicalism. As a consequence we have trade unionists among our soldiers, or soldiers try to carry their demands via the trade unions. Due to a decree, however, only certain trade unions have been admitted by the Minister of Defence and the Defence Minister only is authorized to negotiate with the trade unions. After talks with the chiefs of staff on the subject matters of the trade union demands, which mostly concern »over-time working hours, the too low pay-rates, and the too many days at sea«, the Minister alone will take the decisions as to what measures should be taken. Although there are some points in favour of the trade unions our military administration has become considerably cumbersome and slow. All trade union activities on board of warships are prohibited. If the sailors have any wishes or complaints they are allowed to report them to their division or commanding officer.

K.: In the last months problems of energy supply have become of first priority for all of the European countries. Can you imagine, Admiral, that units of NATO's naval forces would be committed outside the Treaty territory in an energy crisis?

v. D.: No, I cannot, because in the Treaty our area of operations has explicitly been restricted to the North Atlantic by the 23rd degree of northern latitude. Not even in peace-time are we permitted to leave this sea area. From a military point of view, however, this is rather problematic since in a crisis a lot of actions will probably take place outside this zone. Almost the whole bulk of crude oil will be shipped from the Persian Gulf around the spit of South Africa before arriving in our zone. Why should we not protect the supply of crude oil on this whole transport route? Due to the Treaty however, we are not permitted to do so. But we show our flags as often as possible outside the NATO territory after planning those visits a long time ahead and reporting them to NATO headquarters, in our instance to CINCHAN and SACLANT. In so doing it may absolutely be possible, as it recently happened, that a Belgian frigate meets a unit of the German Federal Navy on its way to Nigeria and both of them jointly operate for a certain time. But such actions are of a purely binational or trinational character on account of it being not possible to act as a NATO formation in that zone.

K.: Have any restrictions been imposed on Belgian warships due to the energy crisis?

v. D.: So far we have not had any such problems. Our ships carry out their exercises as planned. As to the frigates, there have so far been no restrictions at all, but my estimates have already been exceeded by far due to the price development so that we now have to practise economy.

K.: How do you assess the Soviet maritime threat, Admiral?

v. D.: There is a threat, of course, and just before the door to our house, indeed. You meet Soviet vessels everywhere, and you can certainly speak of a world-wide deployment of the Soviet Navy. This change of the situation took place with an unbelievable rapidity. Until 1962/63 I was on duty afloat. At that time I hardly saw any Soviet warships in the maritime areas we operated in. Now they appear everywhere, and not only with one ship but with whole formations. Not too long ago a Soviet formation operated under extremely difficult conditions in the Northern Waters where, incidentally, Soviet ships are constantly present. This sea area is particularly suited for the training of efficient crews. During the war I was in this area and know, therefore, how difficult it is to navigate there. That is why you must be conscious of the fact that the Soviet naval forces have in the meantime developed from a purely defensive Navy to world-wide sea power. Their matériel is excellent and the individual ship types are being constantly improved. They even passed the Americans in the submarine sector. In this context it is necessary to point to the rapid development of the Soviet merchant fleet. This government owned merchant

fleet, led central by Moscow, represents a very important logistic support for the navy. But what is most alarming in my eyes is the fact that you can notice the development on our side is the other way round. Our armed forces are being reduced. The Americans, indeed, established a new programme, and an ambitious one, but we do not know whether the congress will approve it. Four sure, the Soviet Navy has its weaknesses but yet we should not disregard the results of this impressive evolution. The Soviet Navy is now deployed on a world-wide basis and exercises a political influence that should not be underestimated. Today the Cuba crisis, for instance, would have quite different results. On NATO's side the Americans have always deployed the strongest military forces so far, but now they are glad if their partners make stronger armament efforts, a clear token of their not being capable of keeping up with the Soviets. Until the 1960's the Americans had been in a position to do on the oceans whatever they wanted. This is quite different today, time has changed.

K.: Thank you, Admiral.

CSO: 3120

**ARCHBISHOP CALLS FOR UNITY AND STRUGGLE**

Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 0937 GMT 2 Sep 79 NC

[Sermon delivered by Archbishop Khrysostomos of Cyprus at the village church of Evrykhou on the feast day of St Mamas, 2 Sep 79—live]

[Text] Today, the feast day of Saint Mamas, the patron saint of Morphou, we have gathered here, blessed Christians, to pray together to God to help us liberate our enslaved lands and return to our towns and villages that have been grabbed from us by the Turkish invaders. We have also gathered here to proclaim once more that neither time nor any other force will be able to erase from within us the memory of our ancestral hearths, and even less so, determination to struggle as long as we live—we and our children, and if need be the children of our children—for the liberation of these ancestral hearths and our return to them.

There are many who expect us to yield and to forget: there are many who believe that time on the one hand, and solving the economic problems created for us by the invasion on the other, will lead us in to forgetfulness and indifference. But at moments both opportune and inconvenient for them we will, with our militant demonstrations and our unyielding pursuit of our rights, keep on disappointing them without fail. Because it does not elude us that if our fatherland remains divided this will create a bridgehead for the invader and then we shall never be sure that everything we are building today will also be ours tomorrow.

All of us know, of course, that our road is difficult. That is why it is necessary to have patience and persistence, wisdom and at the same time boldness, but foremost it is necessary to be flexible in our course. We also need stability and a monolithic approach as to our objectives that can be no less than the liberation of our enslaved fatherland [faint applause], and the recovery of our rights in toto. What is also especially needed is unbreakable unity. For this reason all those who have not yet understood this necessity for unity, and are moving along the tentacles of partisanship and their personal ambitions, all those who look at the solution of our problem according to their party or political affiliation, either

fail to comprehend the risks we are running or prove to be not quite up to the crucial nature of the circumstances through which our country is passing.

In the face of the danger of our being uprooted once and for all from this land of our fathers, everything else must be set aside. Everyone of us must mobilize himself, and all of us as one—rightists and leftists—must rally together in the common struggle. The hearts and thoughts of all must meld on the militant ramparts for the salvation of our fatherland, for survival and for our vindication.

But to achieve this, and for our struggle to become real and effective, it is necessary to safeguard the republic, and what is more, to strengthen our standing as a state. That is why it is with great sorrow that we witness attempts by one faction to impose its views on the other—in the government in particular—which does not contribute to the safeguarding of the republic, nor does it contribute to strengthening our standing as a state. The political bitterness, that has been created these days round the problem of the government reshuffle, has unfortunately fertilized, nourished and given strength to weeds of dissension at the same time lowered the prestige of the government and even undermined internationally, and to a considerable degree, our standing as a state. Because, if one party or one faction in the name of democracy abrogates the institutions and the laws of the republic and as for either the removal of a minister that it does not favor, or the retention of a minister to its liking, you can imagine the chaotic state into which our country will be led, and how much of a laughing stock we shall become in the eyes of international society. Such attitudes not only split the people but also sap the strength from, and subvert the possibilities, conditions and prerequisites for waging our struggle.

That is why as your spiritual father I address myself to everyone—regardless of political or party affiliation—I address myself to those who feel the tragedy with us and to those who suffer agony with us daily when they see the division of our fatherland and the Turkish aggressors standing here armed to the teeth and lying in wait; we call on them to realize the risk we are running and to close their ears to any voices of dissension whether these come from those who have designs on democracy or from those who peddle it for profit.

We have suffered a lot so far from dissension and conflict among our people. Let us finally come to our senses. The enemy is no longer outside the gates; he is in our homes, slaughtering and looting, mocking us with his swagger. We are all called upon, my brothers, to place our unity for the salvation of our fatherland above everything else; we are all called upon to struggle to expel the invader and thus be able to survive on this land of our fathers.

All those who continue to see our problem as something to exploit for partisan survival, all those who, in the face of the tragic state in which we find ourselves, cannot curb their partisanship or personal ambitions but, to satisfy them, nurture discord and exacerbate dissension among the people,

let me be allowed to say that they are either consciously or unconsciously betraying our struggle, because they willy-nilly become collaborators and allies of our foes. The true patriots are not those who proclaim patriotism from the balconies in squares in order to promote themselves, or who proclaim it on the sidewalks, but those who know and have the strength to sacrifice their ambitions, when circumstances are crucial, on the altar of unity of the people for the salvation of the fatherland.

Cypriot people, the rift of your division into two opposing factions has opened deep these days. All those who, misled by the silence of one faction, have failed to understand this and continue their pressure to impose their views; they will understand this soon and, what is more, in a very painful manner both for them and for all of us. So we address ourselves to all those, who think in the right way, to work with us to mend this rift before it becomes bottomless and unbridgeable and is filled by the lurking enemy with his tanks and cannons.

Dearly beloved, we know that there are many, and not only foreigners but also some of our own, who are bothered by the call for us to prepare for a multifaceted struggle--until vindication. Others, again, look at the weaknesses, and because they see everything through the prism of inanimate logic and regard each struggle, either at home or on the international arena, as a vain effort, and do not hesitate to sneer at our recourses to the United Nations and other international congresses, such as the recent Commonwealth conference and the nonaligned one taking place now. Yet others regard the call for a relentless struggle as chauvinism that will lead to disaster. All of them point out to us that we should not foster delusions among the people but face things with realism so that we may be able to find a solution. But neither one nor the other tell us what they mean by realism. Do they mean that we should abandon every struggle and accept our fate with folded arms as treachery and foreign intervention had wanted to create for us? Or do they mean that we should tell our people: Cypriot people, forget forever your ancestral lands, forget forever your homes and your property because since you cannot reverse events you must accept plunder and injustice with fatalism? If they mean that with this realism we can find a solution, then we agree because it does not need a lot of effort: one day would be enough to solve our problem. But it would be solved first of all with partition and later with the Turkification of our whole fatherland. Then again if they mean that with realism we shall find a solution through the intercommunal dialog for which many--both in and out of Cyprus--are breaking their necks and love so much, let me be allowed to say once more that if we uphold such a view sincerely we are both deluding ourselves and really fostering illusions among our people. Because it has proved beyond any shadow of doubt that it is a vain effort to expect to find a solution from the intercommunal dialog. This is for two reasons: Firstly because our problem is not an intercommunal dispute--it is the consequence of foreign intervention--and secondly because so long as the invading troops are still here no effective intercommunal dialog can be conducted. It is also because the

Turkish Cypriots cannot freely voice their views. They are obliged to say whatever is dictated to them by Ankara. That is why, as you may have noticed, the intercommunal talks are promoted each time they are needed to facilitate Turkey in receiving either financial or military aid, and to make this the pretext and justification for the countries wanting to give aid to the invader.

So let us not delude ourselves. It is not the Turkish Cypriots that stand before us. What we have is Turkey and its expansionist policy that craves the capture of the whole of Cyprus. And let us not be so naive as to believe that once we can convince the Turkish Cypriots of our good intentions and offer them sincere cooperation and friendship then we can solve our problem. Because with the Turkish Cypriots we basically have no difference. We have lived together side by side in mixed villages and towns, without problems or differences, in a spirit of peace and mutual trust. And the Turkish Cypriots are well aware, just as we are well aware, that neither difference in religion nor differences in language and nationality divided us into two opposing camps. It was foreign objectives and interventions to serve foreign interests and primarily to serve the expansionist policy of Turkey.

It may one day be necessary, of course, to hold an intercommunal dialog. But this will be the last phase of the solution to the whole problem. Because today, as we have said, the Turkish Cypriots are powerless to express their will because they live in the shadow of intimidation from the military presence of Turkey in Cyprus. So how can we ...ach a solution when the Turkish Cypriots are not the real interlocutors? How can we reach the solution of a problem that has been created by Turkish intervention? From our experience so far we can say that the intercommunal talks are nothing but a fiasco and a fraud both for us and for international opinion.

Under these circumstances, therefore, and faced with this tragic state of affairs, we have nothing left but to struggle both at home and in the international arena. At home with our unbreakable unity, by strengthening our standing as a state, with our defense shield, by raising high within us our militant belief, by preparing ourselves spiritually for sacrifices, and by stability and a monolithic approach to our orientations and objectives. On the international arena through continuous promotion of our rights from every forum offered to us and with perseverance for the adoption of specific measures by international organizations against the invader. Thus we will be able both to keep our problem continuously alive on the international stage and to make things really difficult for Turkey, and especially to make the big powers consider our problem to the point that they are obliged to ask for the implementation of the UN resolutions.

Dearly beloved, forging our unity both as a church and as a government and state, as well as political parties and people, on the anvil of the fatherland, and by steeling our will for a relentless struggle to the end, until vindication, we will be able to convince everyone, friend and foe, big and small, that our people are not prepared to accept the division of their fatherland, that they are not prepared to accept the mutilation of their freedom and their rights.

The superiority in arms and numbers of Turkey's military presence in Cyprus of course lies heavy on our souls. But it is precisely this military presence which must keep us constantly vigilant. It must help us to realize more deeply both our responsibilities and our duties, and, what is more, the necessity of uniting and rallying our forces. Let our course be difficult and appear to be a long term one. As long as we believe in the struggle and as long as we consider the consequences of Turkey's military presence here, we shall never allow either time or hardships to crush us. With our powers constantly being reborn in the crystal-clear spring of our national history and tradition we will march forward, always forward, disregarding sacrifices, looking ahead toward a happy and free future. We shall be patient and we shall persevere. We shall fight from every suitable bastion and prepare for the great start, awaiting more favorable circumstances and international conditions to appear. We know that it is interests that determine the policy of the big powers but we also know that, in the face of the righteous strength of the small countries, the big ones often find themselves at a loss. Another thing that we know is that these very interests are not always compatible.

These things are neither chauvinism nor irrationality, as some so-called reasonable people want to present the call for a relentless struggle. It is a process that is imposed on us by circumstance, that is dictated to us by an awareness of our duty—our duty to our fatherland, to ourselves, to our children, to our parents. It is also the course and path charted for us by the need to survive and liberate our fatherland. Because if, as I said, our fatherland remains divided, if we do not succeed in liberating it, then the consequences for us will be grave and will prove fatal both for our people and our country. So the struggle and whatever sacrifices may be needed are under present conditions the only road open to us.

Dearly beloved, when in a little while you leave this church, look down at the valley of Morphou that was made verdant by your heavy toil and sweat; recall the church of St Mamas which, although it is its feast day today, stands there closed, sad, without candles, without oblation, without psalms, and without incense; and look even farther to the hills of Pendaduktilos opposite and think of beautiful Kyrenia that lies hidden behind, think of sea-kissed Famagusta, of Mesaoria and the Karpas, and in the face of this view and with this introspection place your hand on your tortured heart and, brothers, make a pledge; No, we shall never forget you beloved towns and villages; we shall not forget you churches of the north; we shall not forget you, oh hills and dales of the Karpas and our whole enslaved fatherland! [applause] We shall not forget your graves and holy pilgrimages of our forefathers! [applause] The passion of return shall become within us a passion and a flame that will raze the walls of separation and scorch the roadblocks and dividing lines that have severed Cyprus into north and south. Yes, brethren, make this passion the passion of your life, a flame, the way of life and struggle until the day when we shall be able to liberate every enslaved inch and corner of our fatherland. Until the day that we will once again be free to conduct services in the church of St Mamas in Morphous and all our churches in the north. Let us hope that the God of love, justice and freedom will, through the intercession of St Mamas, help us and that this day of resurrection is not long in coming.

**TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER REPLIES TO KHRYSOSTOMOS STATEMENTS**

Bayrak Radio (Clandestine) in Turkish to Cyprus 1030 GMT 3 Sep 79 TA

[Text] President Rauf Denktas has said that the Greek Cypriots have not given up the Akritas plan aimed at annihilating the Turkish Cypriots and at uniting Cyprus with Greece. Denktas was replying to statements made by Greek Cypriot Archbishop Khrysostomos on 2 September in which he called for the liberation of northern Cyprus.

Denktas noted that the Greek Cypriot leadership was trying to disrupt the right to partnership of the Turkish Cypriots by efforts they were making at the nonaligned summit. TAK [Turkish Cypriot News Agency] reports that Denktas said that the church which had brought Cyprus to its present situation with its anachronistic policies could drag it in other directions as well. Denktas continued: However, through our national will and resistance we shall easily overcome these new adventures being envisaged by the church and the Greek Cypriot leadership. It is imperative that in the process we should safeguard and enhance our unity and solidarity and attachment to the motherland.

Pointing out that Khrysostomos' statements had not taken him by surprise, President Denktas said that since 1955 that the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus has made efforts to annihilate the Turkish Cypriots of the island and has considered the destruction of everything Turkish a national and religious task. Denktas noted that Khrysostomos, like Kyprianou, has taken over his post from Makarios. The aim of this post is the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots and the unity of Cyprus with Greece in accordance with the Akritas plan. Let us not expect that they will ever give this up. Let us recall the historic realities. As long as we act with the determination that we have a right to a partnership in the status of Cyprus and that we shall safeguard our state based on this status, we shall continue to exist in this sacred land. If there will ever be an agreement with the Greek Cypriots, it will be based on this fundamental principle. Khrysostomos on the one hand and the Greek Cypriot leadership in Havana on the other are struggling for the disruption of this basis.

Khrysostomos' call for the liberation of northern Cyprus is part of the Makarios policies of liberating Cyprus. The implications are the same: to annihilate the Turkish Cypriots, to Hellenize the island and to establish a second Greece in the Mediterranean.

Denktas said that the statements by Khrysostomos should serve as a warning to those who hoped that the Greek Cypriot leadership and church would give up this aim. Denktas concluded his statement as follows: Such statements should be carefully assessed by Turkish Cypriot youth. It is this patriotic, struggling and Kemalist youth they will find confronting them when the Greek Cypriots try to throw out the Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus in order to achieve their national aspirations.

CSO: 4907

**MORALE, LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS IN BUNDESWEHR EXAMINED****Nature, Extent of Crisis**

Bonn DIE WELT in German 13 Jul 79 p 6

[Article by Ruediger Moniac: "Between Sparta and Lucullus -- Indications of a Crisis in the Bundeswehr"]

[Text] What is wrong with our Bundeswehr? Is its future already behind it? How serious is the dissension that has sprung up on all sides? Where do the causes lie? Is the Bundeswehr becoming a peacetime army in the negative sense only? With grumbling officers and noncommissioned officers because career opportunities are poor? With listless recruits to whom no superior can convey the import of their military service both simply and convincingly? Or what is worse: Is a general lack of direction on the part of the people also being carried over to the internal troop situation?

There is no doubt that the Bundeswehr is heading for an internal crisis. No one knows precisely where the roots of this crisis lie; only indistinct signs can be discerned, but they are sufficient to allow a diagnosis of a generally dangerous situation.

The logical question is this: "Is this also causing the value of the army to deteriorate?" -- the value of the army which consists in guaranteeing the external security of our country? Count Baudissain wrote at the beginning of the 1960's: "The effectiveness of the army is derived from active obedience, shared responsibility, discipline and toughness on the part of the individual. Reduced to the briefest terms, the real task of information and indoctrination is precisely this: To arouse and promote the will to work together, share responsibility and actively obey orders within the Bundeswehr." Its task doubtless is still the same today; however, there are increasing doubts as to whether it is accomplishing this task.

Defense Minister Hans Apel, a "nonveteran" prior to assuming office, also gave free rein to his scepticism regarding the area of information and indoctrination in a recent speech. He is familiar with the problems of the troops "only" from the perspective of the man in charge, a fact which made

all the more remarkable a thought that he expressed in this regard. Said Apel: "The Bundeswehr cannot mend the ways of the Germans or solve the problems that we have. But the Bundeswehr has a great opportunity to revive the subject of information and indoctrination, take it seriously, give it substance and take up the challenges of our time that lie within it, thus perhaps acting in a sense as an example for processes that are taking place in an increasingly uncoordinated and chaotic manner elsewhere (to be more precise: outside the Bundeswehr)."

This notion virtually borders on audacity, for it flirts with the idea that our modern life of ease, made possible by technology, can be assured in the future only if we observe "military principles." These would most likely be discipline, a sense of duty, frugality, the feeling of belonging together and similar virtues. One can picture only Japanese society in this way -- which, according to the OECD, should continue to be true for the medium term as well -- but not German society.

Why not? Its thoughts run too much to self-gratification; it goes on strike for more leisure time whenever it becomes difficult to obtain wage increases; in general, it uses a great deal more energy searching for advantages for the individual rather than promoting the good of all.

Misguided conduct of this sort has rubbed off on the army. Given a choice between the Spartan and the Lucullan, it tends to choose the latter. The result is degeneration into fat complacency and indolence. The danger is great, and it is a threat not only in terms of the "material" self-gratification of the soldiers -- promotion, pay, fixed hours and so forth -- it is no less a threat in terms of a spiritual gloominess, indeed a characteristic pessimism.

Symptomatic of this is the still rising tide of regulations, directives, guidelines and orders that flows in upon the troops. Some of them are unnecessary but are written up by superiors who are no longer prepared to assume the risks that go with responsibility. Instead, they issue their orders to subordinates in the most minute detail, telling them how to do what, thereby neglecting the major principle that other armies admire so much about the German army -- tactics.

We hasten to add that no one claims that these military leaders are purposely "covering themselves." Indeed, they do it because it has become the custom in the Bundeswehr, and they are no longer self-critical enough in holding themselves accountable for the harmful consequences.

There have been yet other danger signals of a kind of military infarction. And for as long as the Bundeswehr has been in existence, it has been customary at such times to proclaim the failure of information and indoctrination. Certainly many a critic is tempted to do this today as well, for it promises to enhance his public image. Of course, it would do little to improve the situation.

Even given the uncertainty over the direction which information and indoctrination was meant to take over the years -- sometimes aimed at safeguarding the individuality of the soldier, sometimes with more emphasis on a common fighting spirit -- one thing has truly never been disputed: Its task is to see to it that a democratic government like that in Bonn may have at its disposal, for purposes of assuring its capacity to act, an army whose members accept the restrictions entailed in their mission as soldiers because they know that only in this way can this army be effective. They will naturally always question how great the restrictions on them must be.

Today it appears that the soldiers are increasingly inclined to view them as shackles. Where is the contemporary -- in civilian clothes or in uniform -- to show them the happy medium?

#### Noncommissioned Officers

Bonn DIE WELT in German 13 Jul 79 p 3

Article by Ruediger Moniac: "Army Inspector-General Poeppel: 'Noncommissioned Officers Need Greater Recognition'"

Text The army's noncommissioned officers need help, especially the younger ones. They must be better trained and they need a more attractive "professional image" and greater esteem. This is the view of Lt Gen Hans Poeppel, inspector-general of the 340,000-man army. He succeeded Horst Hildebrandt in this office in April and has acquired a detailed overview of the present situation in the army in the meantime. In an interview with DIE WELT, Poeppel underscored the need to improve the efficiency of lower-level military leaders. The general said that the army has concentrated in recent years on increasing the efficiency of its divisions and units with a new structure (Model 4) and has been vigorously pushing the modernization of its weapons. According to the general, the goal for the near future must be to improve conditions for maintaining and increasing the performance of the soldiers.

As a troop commander for many years, Poeppel knows that the noncommissioned officers have to be in the forefront. He says: "Noncommissioned officers have to bear the brunt of training. The young recruit who comes into the Bundeswehr learns from them the reality of the armed forces. It is chiefly the noncommissioned officers who create the atmosphere in the companies and associate with the young citizen recruits. There, as squad and platoon leaders they must not only master the military crafts of tactics, weapons training and leadership, they must also know how to instruct people who enter the army as citizens of a democratic state."

This has to do with political education for noncommissioned officers. The general is trying not to place special emphasis on this concept because he knows that excessive expectations are almost always linked with it. His initiatives designed to further improve conditions in the army are of a

practical nature. They nevertheless have the same effect in the end: the training of capable military instructors and leaders of a democratic bent.

To be specific, General Poeppel intends to approach the task in this way: "In the future, all noncommissioned officers will complete the full course of training (all parts of the troop training). All those serving for longer periods will be given an additional training course that teaches leadership and methods in particular." Those who have been promoted from the group of recruits to the rank of noncommissioned officer after only 1 year are merely to assist the older and more experienced noncoms as "junior instructors" and be available chiefly as combat leaders. "This plan can of course be realized only if the army continues to obtain sufficient numbers of noncommissioned officers who are willing to serve longer enlistments. This concept will come of age if and when we succeed in making clear that the noncommissioned officer is receiving solid, well-grounded training, enjoys greater esteem and gains the impression that he has an important role to fill in the army; in other words, if and when the position has a good professional image and social prestige."

Recently the same complaint has been heard over and over again at all levels of the army: The poorly trained noncommissioned officer is giving poor training. The experienced ones themselves are distressed to recognize that their young comrades are superficial and uncertain in dealing with their subordinates as a consequence of their own inadequate training. They therefore have little self-confidence and thus ultimately tend to develop more of a buddy-relationship than a convincing leadership stance. It is General Poeppel's intention not to assign these "short-timers" as training instructors with sole responsibility unless absolutely necessary. He says: "In the very brief periods during which they are available to the army as short-time soldiers, they cannot be turned into experienced instructors versed in pedagogical methods and the military craft. But they have learned how to give their squads proper tactical leadership in combat. These noncommissioned officers are therefore important to the army for many different kinds of tasks as reserve noncommissioned officers -- as squad leaders or tank commanders, for example."

At this point the general comes to the subject of an important part of his future activity. Poeppel is concerned with strengthening that part of the army which has only small numbers of personnel during peacetime and requires mobilization to fill its complement of reservists. The inspector-general reports that he has instructed his staff to study how the effectiveness of the reservist potential of about 3 million men can be increased. The Model 4 army structure adopted during the time of Poeppel's predecessor, Hildebrandt, offers a place from which to start.

"The reorganization has begun," he adds. "It will take time, and we shall have a number of complex problems to solve in accomplishing it. Increased reservist exercises will be important in improving the fighting strength of

the divisions of the territorial army. Obvious improvements are still necessary in this area," concludes the general.

#### Leadership and Motivation

Bonn DIE WELT in German 14 Aug 79 p 4

[Article by Dr Manfred Woerner, CDU/CSU member of the Bundestag: "Woerner: Too Little Emphasis on Character"]

[Text] Information and indoctrination has once again become a topic of conversation. One could be pleased about this if it were not becoming increasingly obvious that the discussion is threatening to take the wrong direction. Far too many people who have not the slightest perception of the realities of the Bundeswehr are talking about information and indoctrination. Premature judgments -- or rather, preconceived judgments -- are being made which say a great deal more about the political bias of the one doing the judging than about military practice. I maintain the following contrasting viewpoints:

1. The information and indoctrination program in our army is in much better condition than many critics would have us believe. Its intellectual foundation and its political orientation -- respect for human dignity and recognition of the soldier as a citizen -- are largely unquestioned in the army today.
2. The difficulties -- and they are increasing -- lie in translating the concept into everyday practice. The issue here is something much more modest and perhaps for this very reason much more difficult: that of applying the larger principles in small, painstaking steps in daily practice.

In my view there are three increasing obstacles in particular to practical realization of the information and indoctrination program:

1. A training concept that overemphasizes intellectual abilities at the expense of character. The transmission of knowledge is taking the place of educating. The practical art of leadership is increasingly retreating to the background in the training of our officers and noncommissioned officers. The only thing that counts now is that which can be measured. We are turning out officers who can indeed draw up a perfect sociogram of a battalion staff but are barely able to lead even a single squad out of the trenches.
2. Ever-increasing burdens and excessive demands on officers and noncommissioned officers in their everyday work with the troops. Weekly work loads of around 60 hours are the rule. Many companies have only one officer besides the company commander. Many noncommissioned officers -- frequently the best ones -- are attending one of the innumerable training courses. Under these circumstances how is a company commander to carry out an information and indoctrination program even with the best of intentions? He should

not be blamed for the fact that complaints about goldbricking and lack of personal contact have multiplied conspicuously among the troops of late.

3. An increasing, cold perfectionism, a for the most part unnecessary flood of paperwork -- produced from above -- and a bureaucratic attitude which undermines spontaneity and a willingness to assume responsibility and which is born of a passion for the centralized regimentation of all matters. The examples are legion. What is one to think when a very fine young officer unfortunately cannot be promoted because the computer has the final word?

The dismal thing about the situation is that it is not chiefly the superior officers out among the troops who are to blame for the abuses which are preventing the information and indoctrination program from being realized in practice; it is those political and military authorities at the top who make the most elegant remarks about the program, thus reaping at best a shrug of the shoulders from the troops -- and deservedly so. One of these priceless pronouncements was made by the defense minister when he said in his completely valid policy remarks on information and indoctrination: "As commander-in-chief, the minister must also respect the principles of information and indoctrination." And then in the same breath he pursues an increasingly undisguised personnel policy that has less regard for qualifications than for party membership. For example, he has scheduled several officers from his party, the SPD, for leading positions with NATO. One of them is even to be promoted, although he unquestionably has neither the necessary military training nor the appropriate experience and qualifications for the position. On the other hand, Minister Apel keeps silent in the matter of Major General Bastian, his divisional commander who has just made headlines for the second time as a consequence of undisciplined public statements concerning matters outside the purview of his military mission.

Such precedents are often imitated. Better examples and fewer speeches could do much to improve the situation.

All the difficulties enumerated here could be eliminated or at least diminished through resolute leadership. The defense minister could improve the practical work of information and indoctrination by pursuing the following actions:

1. Subjecting the training concept to revision and upgrading troop leadership;
2. Taking some of the pressure off the troops;
3. Curbing bureaucratic regimentation and perfectionism from the top down -- that means from his ministry on down -- thus treating tactics seriously once again.

The CDU/CSU parliamentary group has developed specific and detailed positions on all these points; they now need only to be put into practice.

## Administration vs Leadership

Bonn DIE WELT in German 14 Aug 79 p 4

[Article by Colonel Klaus Grasbert (ret): "The Army Is No Longer Being Led; It Is Being Administered"]

[Text] The "internal crisis" in the Bundeswehr is presumably more serious than had been thought. Qualified personnel have been deeply affected by the entire situation.

Of what use are the best weapons systems in the long run if the leadership is weak? And I refer here not to the "military" that is so often decried. It will not become better if it increasingly comes to depend upon career men of its own kind (meaning party) or yet indirectly upon those who curry favor (by no means all!). But deliberation along these lines is no longer confined to the Hardthoehse; it has cast its shadow at the level of officers serving with the troops -- for example, those who despite career training courses have been unable to attain their professional goal, or have attained it too late in life. But this is only one aspect that has its roots in the so-called "equitable promotion system." Desperately being singled out once again as a scapegoat for the crisis is the darling of the Bundeswehr -- "information and indoctrination." There is no question that the effects of the affluence syndrome are also gnawing at the clear catalog of duties. But this is not the fault of those who administer "information and indoctrination" and their constant attempts at redefinition. The weak point is leadership itself! The initiated are familiar with the following facts:

Clear, incorruptible decisions based on facts are becoming increasingly rare. Compromises that are open to personal appeal are being sought;

Protracted processes of inquiry and deliberation make it almost impossible for one to have the courage to make necessary, overriding decisions that are always going to offend a few;

Even petty matters are dragged through the political planning apparatus to the higher-ups and "defused" whenever they do not seem to suit the leftist element of the population (one can often deduce from reading VORWAERTS what will appear on tomorrow's appointments calendar);

Clear organizational bases for a hierarchical leadership process that is indispensable in the army (a process that includes the cooperative style of leadership) are being avoided (it is better to leave things as they are, lest one cause trouble for oneself);

New duties are constantly being added one after another, while personnel are not being released from less important functions (after all, who wants to make the decision that a good many things are indeed very desirable, but nonessential?);

The army is being administered -- and this does not mean it has an inefficient administrative apparatus; it means that those who are doing the leading are themselves no longer able to make decisions on leadership issues. With reference being made to the priority of the budget and the personnel situation, important decisions are being blocked without saving a single pfennig (the finance minister decides today whether a guard needed at a command center shall actually appear and what rank he may have).

The political leadership itself ought to rise above this so exalted independence of its parts and finally have the courage to lead. It should show this courage by not measuring major decisions by the criterion of not offending anyone, but according to the requirements of effectiveness and thus of profitability and economy as well.

When the top leaders truly begin to lead again, the chiefs and commanders will follow suit. Then, even with acceptance of and on recognition of personal sacrifices and career limitations, occupying a position between Sparta and Lucullus will be that "Prussian" performance of duty which is not so bad after all, and which has not remained confined to Prussia. Then we shall no longer be hearing "yes, but..."; it will be "yes, sir!"

#### Political Education

Bonn DIE WELT in German 14 Aug 79 p 4

[Article by Commander Erhard Franz, Kiel: "The Bundeswehr -- A Politically Inept Fighting Machine?"]

[Text] Minister Apel made two noteworthy points in his latest address to the Advisory Council on Information and Indoctrination. Regarding the first, he said that an analysis of weaknesses with respect to information and indoctrination must begin not so much at the lowest level -- with the relationship between chiefs and platoon leaders and the soldiers -- but rather with the commanders and those above them, all the way up to the ministry. The second point is that information and indoctrination should simply be equated with forward-looking Bundeswehr leadership, which must always relate to people as well as to the political purpose of our defense efforts, however much the main focus must be on war, which is to be avoided, and on accomplishing the military mission. As regards the human and political dimensions of a leadership that is in tune with the times, the minister ably understood how to put the former into concrete terms. He pointed up the principles of collegiality and plurality. And he contrasted them with the necessities of effectiveness as well as command and obedience in an army of today. The speech explains why, if necessary, "some of its effectiveness" must be sacrificed if this means gaining some room to maneuver, getting rid of bureaucratic ways and avoiding the image of the cold technocrat who, except for tactical reviews and statistics on deployment readiness, has his sights set at most on his own career or his own material interests.

By comparison, however, the political dimension of the information and indoctrination program unfortunately remained obscure in this ministerial address (as well). The importance of political education in the casernes was lauded in a general and noncommittal way. In addition, with the help of the Information and Indoctrination School, the discussion of those global problems which constitute a challenge to the Bundeswehr and society alike is to be intensified.

What is to be done specifically? Which topics must be the principal ones to be delved into and discussed by which circles?

Is it not obvious that Europe's fateful question of war or no war in the decades just ahead should be the primary intellectual concern of the very ones who see the risks most clearly -- the military leaders? And with all due respect for necessary discretion, are these leaders not being far too abstinent with regard to discussion of these portentous political problems?

The time has come for the veil of suspicion to be lifted from proper involvement -- the suspicion that this involvement reflects party politics or remarks that conform to a leftist or rightist cliche. And even if this is the case, there is an urgent need to work through the contradictions between the necessities of armament, deterrent and defense on the one hand and arms control, detente and the establishment of trust within the East-West relationship on the other in order to clear away these contradictions. The Bundeswehr is definitely in danger of being regarded as a politically inept fighting machine if its leaders always know all about the exigencies of a defensive battle but know nothing about how to safeguard peace. The old saying to the effect that he who desires peace must prepare for war ("Si vis pacem, para bellum") no longer comes close to doing justice to this complex situation.

It is a certainty that Minister Apel could do all democratic parties a service if he exhorted his Bundeswehr leaders to view this concern not as a topic for a "casual chit" -- a "minor point," as they say in NATO-German -- but rather to view it from the standpoint of measurable quality in the leadership of the Bundeswehr.

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CSO: 3103

**POLARIZATION MARKS NONALINED MOVEMENT**

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 10 Sep 79 p 3 DW

[Commentary signed YR: "The Dilemma of the Nonaligned"]

[Text] Seldom before have the beams of the nonaligned been creaking as loudly as they did at the sixth summit conference of chiefs of state and government in Havana. Even though they succeeded in avoiding the potential split of the movement frankly hinted at by some heads of delegations, the internal state of the movement, which has increased from 25 to 95 full members since 1961, has never before offered as disrupted and polarized a picture as it did these past few days.

The discordant clanging in Havana, however, had already been preceded by a loud overture ever since Cuba appeared in Africa as a spearhead of the Soviet Union and ever since the Vietnamese pact of aggression against Cambodia has made the fact of wars by proxy within the movement of the nonaligned a sad political reality.

The demonstrative polarization within the nonaligned movement into so-called progressive and conservative states took shape soon after the assignment of this most recent summit conference to Havana in Colombo 3 years ago. It merely reached a new dimension on the sugar island. This was attributable, last but not least, to the free and easy exploitation of the stage direction possibilities by Fidel Castro which he derived from his role as the host under benevolent Soviet acclamation and with the help of which he sought to manipulate the conference to Moscow's liking. But he did shrink back from the ultimate enforcement of his pro-Soviet thesis in a one-sided anti-imperialist, anti-Western final document in view of the active Yugoslav-Indian counteraction.

And yet, he chalked up some successes for Moscow. The fact that Cambodia's chair at the conference remained empty is a point in favor of Vietnam. The treatment of the overthrown Pol Pot regime, which still has seat and vote in the United Nations, was a step toward making the government installed in Cambodia presentable.

In the long run, however, such successes might have an undesired boomerang effect for the bloc of about 16 delegations grouped around Cuba, the bloc of those nonaligned states which regards the Soviet Union as the "natural ally" of the movement and which therefore recommends the movement's clear rapprochement with an attachment to Moscow. Seldom before at a summit conference has a group of nonaligned states so clearly unmasked itself with its unequivocal bloc inclinations and thereby provoked the contradiction of the majority of those moderate forces which, despite different assessment of the two blocs, endeavor to have equal political distance to both.

The polarization of the movement probably will be the determining feature for the next few years. Yet it will hardly lead to an organized rupture because the pro-Soviet forces, after all, will be successful only if and when they bring the whole movement over to the Moscow line. Cuba, however, will surely continue the manipulation attempts already made in Cuba, exploiting its role as chairman in the coming 3 years.

It will be necessary to watch carefully how nonaligned the nonaligned will appear in the United Nations and at other multilateral events in the future. The ideological and political antagonisms which abruptly erupted in Havana hardly indicate, however, that their united action will be enhanced after this summit meeting. The old problems on which such a manifoldly structured movement was based from the outset becomes all the more burdening the greater the number of its members becomes.

CSO: 3103

## FRG SPOKESMAN INTERVIEWED ON SCHMIDT BUDAPEST VISIT

Frankfurt Hessischer Rundfunk Network in German 1030 GMT 9 Sep 79 DW

[Excerpts from interview with Deputy Federal Government spokesman Armin Gruenewald by reporters Middeldorf and Purwin in Bonn--recorded]

(Excerpts) [Question] Talks between the Federal Republic and the East bloc states have started moving again. But has politics begun moving as well? Are we not in a certain stagnation despite all the meetings? I am thinking of disarmament in this context, of the cultural talks and of the Berlin issue. So when will politics be moving, when will things go beyond talks?

[Answer] You used three catchwords each of which belong to an entirely different context. As far as intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons are concerned disarmament is a matter of negotiation between the superpowers--the Soviet Union and United States. To relate this to the chancellor's visit with Mr Kadar one could say that this matter can be discussed and prospects that might result talked about among those who did not sit at the negotiating table.

Cultural questions are a bilateral matter, and to that extent they are to be promoted in such a dialog; only, SALT II cannot be promoted by the chancellor and Mr Kadar because it will not be ratified either in Hungary or in our country, but both were agreed that it is important to ratify SALT II.

Let me get back to cultural affairs. I believe it was significant, and a success, that the chancellor had representatives of public life and of the cultural sphere in his official delegation. While in Budapest the chancellor stated in public how important he thinks it is that the common awareness is promoted again between the states of Eastern Europe and those of Western Europe, that all these states, after all, represent a common culture, no matter when they became national states and no matter with which system they are affiliated today, and that it would surely be good for the continuation of detente policy if the peoples were to think about it more strongly.

Well, this is a general statement which, however, does not yet push a cultural agreement ahead. We have had such a cultural agreement for 2 years now, and the chancellor has made it plain how much he cares that it is not primarily a one-way street, that the German-Romanian [as heard] cultural agreement is now being given concrete content. No concrete questions of detail were discussed in that respect between the chancellor and Mr Kadar, but the approving echo his general statements met with allows us to hope indeed that negotiations on details will now make more headway than heretofore.

There was yet a third catchword you used: the four-power agreement. Naturally this is not a subject of negotiation at all between the German chancellor and the Hungarian side, for neither are among the signatory states of this agreement. Yet both--and this is expressed in the communique--were aware, of course, of the important role the four-power agreement, apart from the three treaties concluded by the Federal Republic with Moscow, Warsaw and the GDR, has played, and will continue to play, for the start of the detente process.

Now you are asking whether detente policy will get moving again. My answer is this: No doubt it will in the economic field and in the cultural field as well; in the military issues we must realize that these are not subjects to be negotiated bilaterally but apply to the alliance systems. Still, it is important to talk about them nevertheless.

[Question] These were mere catchwords which I cited to show the state of politics. I feel you answered all of them appropriately. What I had in mind, however, was to ask whether we are in the preliminary phase of new, general political actions. Will detente policy be allowed to proceed through new, visible, controllable events?

[Answer] If we do not wish to understand the military sphere exclusively under detente policy--it is an important sphere, yet not the only one in which detente policy manifests itself--we might say, I think, that we are not just about to enter a new phase of activities but right in the middle of these activities; let me only remind you of the cultural agreements which will yet be started up, let me remind you of the economic exchange which in part is assuming forms that constitute cooperation, namely, co-operation agreements between companies. This lends itself to expansion. And this also played a role in Hungary, namely, further strengthening and broadening cooperation which is already very copious now. So basically the detente process is in progress, leaving aside for the moment the military sphere. It is a very interesting sphere, yet it is not the only field in which detente transpires.

[Question] You just said about this military sphere that it cannot, of course, be settled bilaterally. Still, the chancellor said in Budapest that he will convey the Hungarian position on questions concerning arms control

and disarmament to our Western allies, and that he proceeds from the promise that Kadar would do the same in the direction of his East European allies, above all Moscow.

Can any progress be achieved from such a conveyance of positions, proposals or what have you?

[Answer] I do believe, Mrs Purwin, that progress can be achieved inasmuch as it becomes clear that in this whole concept of military disarmament and arms control the medium powers--let me call them medium powers of the respective alliance systems--also articulate their views and manifest their interests in the continuation of the detente process even if they are not sitting at the negotiating table in each particular case. This was quite plain on the part of the Hungarian side, just as it was on the part of the Polish side when the chancellor visited Mr Gierek. Naturally it is important that the results of such talks as the chancellor had with Mr Kadar are also incorporated in the internal discussion of the Warsaw Pact and, on the other hand, also in the internal opinion-forming process of the Western alliance. This is what the chancellor meant. Then it becomes plain that the German contribution toward detente policy is uniformly expounded and interpreted by the chancellor and the Federal Government toward the West as well as toward the East, that we are not playing with a marked deck, as it were. Nobody can accuse us of that.

[Question] You refer to the German contribution in the detente discussion and toward detente policy. What do you, what does the Federal Republic, anticipate from Hungary in the way of a contribution toward detente policy?

[Answer] Hungary can make a contribution of its own by opening itself again to Western culture, to representatives of Western culture. After all, it is basically a common culture. The contribution could be such that cooperation in the economic field is promoted, that third parties are told that the German and Hungarian economies are cooperating, German-Hungarian enterprise cooperation in third countries commanded much attention in talks, cooperation for instance in countries of the third world. The Hungarians expressed the desire that whenever the Federal Republic grants capital assistance to developing countries we should not rule out from the outset that the project handling might possibly be done in cooperation with Hungarian companies as well. We are quite receptive to the idea; this would also manifest in the third world that the fruit of detente not only exists but is also visible here in Central Europe.

[Question] The economic relations are good, it was generally said. While in Budapest the chancellor had a very long meeting with the vice president of the Hungarian National Bank. May we conclude from this that contemplations are being made as to how the credit issue, the foreign exchange question, can be better settled, how greater rapprochement can be achieved there?

[Answer] No, you would be going off in the wrong direction were you to assume that the chancellor has initiated negotiations on cooperation in currency policy. To the chancellor it is always appealing to talk with people having such a horizon and judgment and to see his own policy also judged by them; not that he takes this as a yardstick for his own actions, but it is valuable indeed to hear some judgment. Thus, there is no connection whatsoever with economic relations, for the credit standing of the People's Republic of Hungary is so good that Hungary has no trouble covering its credit requirements on the international finance markets. There is no credit requirement there at the moment. Besides, the chancellor also made it clear that the German capital market, too, is open to the People's Republic of Hungary, of course, but that it is out of the question to grant state credits. This, by the way, had not been asked, and to that extent it was a precautionary remark. I believe that the quality of the economic relations also reflects the efforts of the Hungarian side to reconcile the planned economy system with a certain freedom of decision in the sphere of the enterprises. Surely it is no coincidence that we have more cooperation agreements with Hungary than with any other East European country.

The chancellor underscored very strongly that they would be happy if this cooperation were to make further headway, also in third countries. However, it is a problem to get away from a planned economy here and learn marketing.

[Question] This also seems to me to be the chief problem. Not only that they understand what is required on the free markets here in the West, but also that there are limits within the systems. There are today more than 330 projects of cooperation between West German and Hungarian enterprises. Is not this already the limit of what is possible? And during Federal Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Budapest mention was made frequently of Hungarian bureaucracy holding up the progress of this process. Are there any new hopes or have new talks been started?

[Answer] I have the impression that the remarks the Federal chancellor made in quite a number of talks--first, you are cordially invited to become active on our market; second, it is a problem to really be successful on this market because it is organized differently from the markets of the Warsaw Pact countries--I believe that the suggestion he made that contacts should be established between as many experts as possible has been listened to in Hungary very attentively and that such contacts will be intensified. This will be possible by simply disregarding the bureaucratic incrustations naturally inherent in such a system. Hungary, as you know, has allowed quite a number of enterprises to do import and export business themselves, without such transactions having to be channeled through a state organization. So here the door of entrepreneurial initiative has already been opened. The point now is that as many people as possible really pass through this open door. I believe, this suggestion by the chancellor will have consequences and will result in more cooperation which, by the way, is going on very well with the Hungarian side. We are not aware of cooperation that does not work.

[Question] Energy policy, naturally, was also discussed in Budapest just like everywhere in the world. Subsequently the Federal chancellor said that he backed the proposal made by Mr Brezhnev recently, that this problem which affects the whole world should be solved or solved tentatively at an international conference. Does the chancellor have any idea of when such conference should be convoked?

[Answer] This idea was taken up shortly after General Secretary Brezhnev had voiced it. We are anxious to see this conference take place within a foreseeable period. As early as this fall another such East-West conference will be held under the auspices of the ECE which will deal with ecological questions. The next meeting to follow will be on energy. I can imagine that it could take place next year.

What will be at stake here will be the energy policy conclusions to be drawn from the oil and oil-price crises which affect the Western and Eastern world equally. In addition, the door must be opened again within the scope of the policy of detente, which has been slammed shut not for economic-geographical but for political reasons. Looking at the economic-geographical map of Europe from the time before World War I you do not quite see why, for instance, we have a north-south electricity supply system only and not an East-West supply system. The idea suggests itself that such a thing be set up. In my view it would be good to discuss this at such a conference on a broad level. In the fields of oil and natural gas we have such a supply system in part. I can certainly be enlarged and deepened and consolidated as a result of the policy of detente.

[Question] In the final communique on Mr Schmidt's visit to Budapest it reads that both the Hungarian and the German sides have decided to jointly study the possibilities of a further development of their relations and the contractual bases of a number of technical fields. I ask you, what does that mean?

[Answer] What is meant by this is a remark the Federal chancellor made and to which Mr Kadar agreed, namely that cooperation must be enlarged via more government departments by way of consultation and the development of additional agreements. Up to now this has been the responsibility of the foreign ministry and the federal economics ministry. It is very conceivable that the research ministry will be included for the fields of research and technology. Culture is working well anyway; here the Federal Government has no responsibility. In this field scientific and technological cooperation can certainly be promoted considerably. I would say it is not without significance that Mr Kadar received this proposal positively. There are possibilities for development here.

[Question] Will these possibilities for development not possibly be hindered by big politics? Do you not have to proceed from the fact that Hungary, too, will reserve the right to itself not to sign the Berlin clause and thus shelve the treaties?

[Answer] This must be expected indeed, but let me complete this somewhat pessimistic answer by the remark that naturally scientific-technological cooperation has long been taking place with the Soviet Union regardless of the fact that an agreement has not been signed. The same will apply to Hungary. Finally, I would like to point to the fact that doubtless there is continuous scientific-technological cooperation with most states of the Western world, and we do not specifically notice it. We have signed no relevant agreement with any of these states. An agreement is good, but it is not absolutely necessary for cooperation to work well.

[Question] The Federal chancellor keeps evading questions about whether he will meet Mr Honecker at some point now that he has been in Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary. When he was on the Danube recently and also when walking in the streets of Budapest he met German people from West and East among the tourists who greeted him. Once could tell by their speech. Some of them called to him: Helmut, when are you going to come and see us? Properly speaking, the chancellor who attaches such great importance to meeting with people should be impressed.

[Answer] He is, Mrs Purwin, and he does not evade an answer either. It has hardly been a week since he answered quite clearly the telephone question of a GDR citizen on a GDR television program from Berlin where televiewers had the opportunity to phone in. Let me repeat the chancellor's answer here to which I will add nothing because that would not be proper. Asked by a GDR citizen when he would come to the GDR, the Federal chancellor said, and now I quote verbatim: There is no invitation, but I think I should say two things; I very much wish to be able to visit the German Democratic Republic in a foreseeable time. This does not depend on me only. Nor does it depend on the wishes only of the one I am going to meet. For such a visit the overall circumstances must be suitable.

So he did answer the question. That his answer does not satisfy some people is a different thing.

[Question] Isn't it contradictory that in this case the circumstances are always mentioned or the matter of what concrete results could come of it? But only in this case, whereas in all other talks, with Mr Gierek or Mr Kadar, for instance, it is said that such a meeting has a value per se.

[Answer] I think we must see one difference clearly. You are referring to the talks with Mr Gierek and we are now talking about the talks with Mr Kadar. In both talks no bilateral, mutual, direct problems really played a part, but the various aspects of the policy of detente were discussed in general which we just broached here, too.

You know that in talks with the GDR leadership the bilateral problems naturally would automatically be in the foreground. That is to say, the expectations surrounding such talks would also be connected with the solution of bilateral problems. In that respect the question regarding a meeting with

Mr Honecker differs clearly enough from the talks the Federal chancellor had this year with the East European neighbors, both as to the matter itself and to the subjects of discussion.

[Question] In the Budapest communique it also says that talks are useful not only between the heads of government but also between other representatives, other government members. In the relations between the Federal Republic and the GDR is not a broader exchange or a broader basis of visits on a level below the Federal chancellor in sight and desirable?

[Answer] In reply to your question I will only state that our minister of housing has already been in the GDR and that his opposite number from the GDR will come to Bonn in October.

CSO: 3103

**HAVANA REFLECTS DISSENSION AMONG NONALINED**

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Sep 79 p 10 DW

[Commentary signed NT: "History in Havana"]

[Text] In what shape are the "nonaligned" after their "summit conference" held every 3 years, this time in Havana? In the opinion of the Bonn Foreign Ministry, advanced recently by its State Secretary Von Well at the opening meeting of the "working circle on third world policy," the "movement of the nonaligned has become a remarkable force for the promotion of independence and equality of the peoples...."

There was not much to be felt of this force in Havana. What was remarkable there, above all, was the dissension which threatened to tear the "movement" to pieces. The rupture was prevented because they succeeded in foiling Fidel Castro's plan to tie the nonaligned closely to the "Soviet camp." But what will happen when some day there is no longer a figure like the old Tito who this time still fought for the independence of the group which he helped found? Those "compromises" which left the question concerning Cambodia's representative unanswered and avoided Egypt's exclusion because of the "resolutely condemned" peace talks with Israel, although exclusion is still possible, bear within themselves the seeds of new controversies. Was Havana, a "chapter of great and historic significance," as Tito said? History, which according to Castro must be the judge of that, will not have a hard time passing judgment.

CSO: 3103

## BRIEFS

NONALINED 'ENEMY IMAGE'--It is quite obvious that the United States, NATO and Israel are predominant in the enemy image of the nonaligned. But this has been true for quite some time and nothing will change in this respect as long as the racist regime in South Africa may count on the material and military support of the West and as long as the Palestinians are denied the right to a homeland. For 3 years Fidel Castro will now be chairman of the nonaligned movement--always endeavoring to achieve the goal which he missed in Havana. Yet the resistance to attempts at denaturing the nonaligned to an instrument of Soviet foreign policy has increased to the same degree as has Cuba's pressure and that of its radical friends. It will be possible to resist that pressure in the long run only, however, if the United States and the West give the nonaligned countries less cause to stick to the accustomed enemy image. [Excerpts] [Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 10 Sep 79 p 4 DW]

CASTRO'S SUCCESS IN HAVANA--The summit conference of the nonaligned states in Havana closed with formulas of compromise. Castro failed to prevail with his demand that the nonaligned states be declared the vanguard or reserve force of the Soviet bloc, as it were. On paper the "moderates"--last but not least also Tito--scored a partial victory. But a closer look will tell that this is all it is, a partial success. The Cubans are and remain present in the movement. For the next 2 years Castro has control over the secretariat. While a clear condemnation of Soviet expansion policy is absent, the policy of the United States is being vehemently criticized. The Federal Republic, too, gets its spanking. The Soviets are aware that a small, radical and energetic minority indeed can "refashion" a large, amorphous movement. This is exactly what is to happen now. Castro demanded 100 percent and got 10. This may not look like much, yet this is 10 percent more than he and the Soviets had held before. [Text] [Bonn DIE WELT in German 10 Sep 79 p 6 DW]

TRADE WITH IRAN DROPS SHARPLY--Hamburg--German-Iranian trade in the first half of 1979 has been badly affected by the events in Iran. According to data released by the Near and Middle East Association (NUMOV) in Hamburg on the Federal Republic's trade with the region during the first 6 months of 1979, German exports to Iran, at DM 1.16 billion, were more than 60 percent below the same period last year, which stood at DM3.19 billion. German imports from Iran in the first half of 1979 declined by some 25 percent to DM 1.54 billion as compared with over DM 2 billion in the same period last year. This drop is chiefly due to lower oil deliveries. Overall, the Federal Republic's trade with the Near and Middle East in the first half of 1979 shows an increase of some 9 percent in imports, at DM 6.70 billion, over the first 6 months of 1978. This is largely due to higher oil prices. On the export side, the Federal Republic's trade with the Near East, totalling DM 8.02 billion (9.46 billion) dropped by 15 percent. [Excerpt] [Hamburg DPA in German 1618 GMT 3 Sep 79 LD]

CSO: 3103

**CASTRO, TITO SAID TO HAVE 'GLOSSED OVER' DIFFERENCES**

Paris LE MONDE in French 6 Sep 79 p 1 LD

[Editorial: "The Third World After Havana"]

[Text] The confrontation between Tito and Castro at the Sixth Nonaligned Countries Summit in Havana turned out to be less serious than expected. This was not because the leaders of the two groups dividing the movement settled their differences but because they agreed to gloss over them.

As the host country's representative Fidel Castro delivered the first speech. Although he did not go back on any of his ideas about the Soviet bloc's "natural solidarity" with the nonaligned countries, the Cuban leader concentrated on justifying the special ties between Cuba and the USSR in his speech. His main point was that without Soviet support the Cuban revolution would not have survived. Cuba cannot forget that fact. However, he added, Cuba "does not want to impose its radical line on anybody and especially not on the nonaligned countries" and during the 3 years that it will hold the movement's chairmanship it will show "patience, prudence, flexibility and calm."

Marshal Tito seemed to have decided to take Castro at his word. In a 30-minute speech on Tuesday 4 September he avoided all controversy and simply outlined the historical principles of a movement of which he is the only surviving founder member: Opposition to bloc politics and to any form of political and economic hegemonism, and upholding each country's right to freedom, independence and autonomous development. Without mentioning Cuba or the USSR--although the allusion was obvious--the Yugoslav head of state added: "We have never agreed to be a tool in anybody's hands."

However, the fact that there was no open conflict between the two men who embody two periods of history does not mean that the conflict has been settled. The fact is simply that neither Castro nor Marshal Tito at present stands to gain from sparking off a clear-cut split in the rather incongruous movement to which they belong. In Tito's view the outcome of an open confrontation would be uncertain: the countries described as "moderate" and which distrust Soviet ambitions as much as Yugoslavia does are far from

belonging to the same political family and are often not inspired by any militant spirit. This is by no means the case with the countries which support Castro: They are economically and militarily dependent on the USSR and for them the struggle is a matter of life or death. What would happen to Vietnam, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Cuba without Soviet aid?

The Cuban leaders seem to have understood these differences in motivation perfectly. Castro is probably able to tolerate the Yugoslav opposition to his ideas since Tito--who is 87 years old--will not always be there to give special prestige to the group he represents. Once the Yugoslav head of state dies Cuba will probably step up its action to win the movement over to its views at the price of abandoning a few countries which are in any case already prepared to boycott the movement. In these circumstances Castro's promises of "prudence and calm" are not likely to carry much weight.

The Cuban head of state's explanation about Havana's "gratitude" toward Moscow would in fact be more convincing had he avoided adopting all aspects of Soviet foreign policy, painting a Manichean picture of a world divided into angels and devils, setting himself up as an infallible high priest of a religion of history which history has taught us to doubt.

CSO: 3100

## PRC-U.S. RAPPROCHEMENT SEEN AROUSING IRE OF USSR

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Aug 79 p 1 LD

[Editorial: "Sino-American Convergences"]

[Text] Despite a rapprochement which was confirmed 8 months ago by the resumption of diplomatic relations, the convergence of interests between China and the United States has never appeared so clearly as in the statements made by the U.S. Vice President during his official visit to Beijing, which ended 29 August, and in the cordiality of the welcome extended to their guest by Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping. Seven years after the Shanghai communique which marked the reconciliation at the end of Mr Nixon's visit, China, long seen by the Americans as the carrier of an ideological incarnation of the "Yellow Peril," seems to have become a close friend in the face of the Soviet "polar bear's" "hegemonist" maneuvers, as Mr Brzezinski said in Beijing last year.

Even though he has denied this, Mr Mondale has clearly adopted an attitude favorable to China. His statement that any weakening of China would be "contrary to American interests," and his implicit support for Beijing's policy in Southeast Asia were bound to greatly irritate the Kremlin. At any rate, Hanoi has lost no time in denouncing Sino-American "collusion."

As far as Kampuchea is concerned, the vice president did not mince his words. "We feel sure," he stated after his meeting with Hua Guofeng, "that Kampuchea's occupation by Vietnam is indefensible and that the puppet government established by Vietnam is unacceptable." He then criticized "the policy of forcible expulsion now pursued" by Hanoi "against ethnic Chinese," reasserting that it is out of the question to normalize relations between the United States and Vietnam unless these problems are solved."

Finally Mr Mondale declared himself in favor of "a broad coalition representative of the Kampuchean people's forces." Prince Sihanouk's role had been mentioned in "general terms" with the Chinese leaders, he added. This allusion enabled the former head of the Khmer state, who was also in Beijing,

to assert that the United States is his "main supporters." It appears furthermore that the Americans support the Khmer anticomunist guerrillas who are fighting against the Vietnamese.

However, Southeast Asia is not the only part of the world where the Americans and the Chinese have similar interests. In fact, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean offer further examples of situations in which, according to Mr Mondale, Beijing and Washington can and must "strive to defend peace...in the face of international challenges," that is, the Kremlin's ambitions.

Mr Mondale's statements were bound to thoroughly please the Chinese leaders. Beijing's dissatisfaction with the White House's delay on ratification of the trade agreement which would grant China most-favored-nation status, as expressed prior to the visit, is no longer being shown openly, and the Chinese barely alluded to the maintenance of relations between Washington and Taipei.

In order to crown this new de facto alliance between the two big Pacific Ocean powers, President Carter is to visit Beijing at the beginning of 1980 and Hua Guofeng has accepted an invitation to visit Washington. Obviously, the interests of the two countries take precedence over their ideological preferences. A few hundred meters from the spot where Hua and Mondale exchanged congratulations some hundreds of peasants in rags were demonstrating to demand that respect be shown for those "human rights" on which Mr Carter has based part of his diplomatic action.

CSO: 3100

## FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER DENIAU INTERVIEWED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 9 Aug 79 p 5

[Interview with Foreign Trade Minister Jean Francois Deniau, by Pierre Zapalski; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Minister Deniau, the increases in the price of oil amount to a tax on France's wealth, hence it seems obvious that we must export more. This is increasingly difficult because most of the industrialized countries, faced with the same problem of the oil bill, also want to sell more. At that point, don't we need to keep a close eye on French imports, not so much to curb them as to look for more opportunities, by "gallicizing" for example a conspicuous link in the chain of French products?

[Answer] Of course, we must export more and more to counteract the rising cost of our oil bill. Our manufacturers and those liable for the payment of services are well aware of this and are striving harder than ever to succeed. As far as the administrative authorities are concerned, they will help by creating conditions favorable to the expansion of their activities. But in conjunction with this effort, the French also need to see and admit that we have to conserve energy and raw materials. We need to keep in mind that a two-percent saving in oil corresponds to over a billion francs. If each Frenchman will make a serious effort in heating, automobile driving, etc., we can save a few billion francs.

You raise also the "gallicization" of prominent links in the chain of products. In this area, we need to be careful and avoid manufacturing just anything at such a high cost that that would be contrary to consumers' interests. Instead, we should return to the list of sectors where we are importing too much and see, through a few concrete examples, what we can do.

[Question] In addition, France's foreign trade presents some weaknesses that economic observers have recently pointed out: too large an orientation towards agricultural food products with low value added, exports based more on brand image than on a commercial policy. Lastly, France is

rich in forests and it imports furniture. The same observation can be made about the leather sector. What can we do?

[Answer] The "weaknesses" that you mention should be carefully examined. If it is true that with regard to the agricultural food sector we are exporting low value added products like grains, sugar, etc...., we must also remember that we are also exporting high price goods like cognac, champagne, etc.....

Furthermore, the largest agricultural exporter in the world, the United States, sells mainly grain and soya, which are not products with a high value added. It is true, however, that we should increase our efforts to steer our agricultural food industry in the direction of high value added goods. This is the meaning of the campaign that I am carrying on, particularly within the Agricultural Food Export Board.

You do well to point out that our foreign trade has been based too long solely on a few prestigious products. Fortunately this period is over and France is now known for the quality of its durable goods, particularly in energy, its airplanes and helicopters, radar equipment, telecommunication equipment, subways, etc. But quality is not enough; we need in fact to expand our trade policies in foreign countries, which requires growth in our establishment abroad.

With regard to forests and leather, we must remember that wood transfer notes account for almost 7 billion francs, the second largest deficit in our foreign trade after oil. Hence we must give it our earnest attention and the Government has set forth for close to 3 years now a very complete collection of measures that should enable us to gradually raise the price on our sylvan estate, the largest in Europe.

[Question] We often hear people say that "There are too many exporters, too many manufacturers looking for a 'kill'." Shouldn't we restrain certain badly prepared vocations and consider exporting as something that is formulated in France first?

[Answer] It is true that a certain picture of the exporter looking for an immediately profitable "kill" remains present in the criticisms often made against us. But still I would not say that there are too many exporters. As a matter of fact, this reproach is already often made to our commercial counselors abroad to discourage certain proposals that are noticeably too ill prepared. What I am really certain of is that it is clear exporting something that is started and makes a profit at home, here in France, first. Indeed we need to carry out the tailoring of the product, producing it in sufficient quantity, and commercial investment at the same time in order to enter a new market. I feel that the progress here has been very rapid, and that the "adventurers" or the "simpletons" in exporting belong increasingly to the past.

The foreign trade offices in conjunction with the chambers of commerce and industry have, as a matter of fact, established a system that allows us to have contacts with manufacturers at home and not just abroad, to help or advise them.

The supportive measures that the government prefers tend, as a matter of fact, to guard against badly followed transactions. For example, the French Center for Foreign Trade can now guarantee a repetition of product trials, that the investigative insurance should be able to cover operations of greater size, and that commercial investment abroad will soon receive substantial incentives.

[Question] World trade takes on different aspects according to whether the EEC countries, industrialized countries, or developing countries are involved. Don't we need a specific strategy for each situation?

[Answer] While it is true that a specific strategy is needed for each situation, it would be difficult to be reduced to the three categories of countries that you mention. Each country, and I would say for each country each product, is a specific problem. For example, the European Economic Community countries are very diverse; work methods in Belgium, Germany, and Italy cannot be comparable. What appears clear to me is that the EEC countries, more broadly Western and Scandinavian Europe, as well perhaps as the United States, are accessible to the tremendous majority of the French firms that want to take the trouble, and in particular the PME [Small and Medium-Size Businesses]. Japan shows that there are more successful cases here than one would think, but it is unquestionable that it remains difficult to approach the country initially.

Concerning the countries with state enterprises, the companies of considerably different sizes that have succeeded in acquiring the confidence of purchasing authorities enjoy regular and often profitable running purchases. In developing countries, there is certainly progress to be made in finding goods tailored to local conditions.

But once again, I prefer to these inevitably brief typological exercises the lesson that I get from all my contacts and all the experiences that are reported to me: successful trade requires a sustained effort, constant presence abroad, a product tailored with respect to the demand, and hence determined according to the targeted market. People no longer sell what they produce; they must produce what they can expect to sell. This is the general rule and key to success in foreign trade.

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CSO: 3100

**SALT II MUST BE THE LAST 'EXCLUSIVE' ARMS AGREEMENT**

Madrid YA in Spanish 28 Aug 79 p 5 LD

[Article by Spanish Senate Defense Committee Chairman Alberto Ballarin Marcial: "Spain and the Alliances"]

[Text] Following my previous articles in YA, in which I maintained that the two blocs--the Warsaw Pact and NATO--are desirable and necessary for maintaining detente and especially for achieving arms limitation agreements, as shown by SALT II and the coming agreements, I was pleased to see my thesis confirmed in A. W. Del Porte's book "Europe Between Superpowers," (Yale, 1978) according to which the enduring balance between the superpowers is what maintains peace in the world--something which certainly used not to be the case. Obviously, without the American alliance, Europe could not achieve this balance of forces with the USSR, whose military strength is continuously growing. Since, from the geopolitical viewpoint, Spain is situated in the Euro-Atlantic system, we have no alternative but to join NATO--I will repeat this once again--to contribute to peace by mean of the balance of forces.

Has this viewpoint perhaps changed as a result of Suárez' latest statements in Brazil against the hegemony of the blocs? Could it change because Spain is to attend the Havana nonaligned conference as a guest?

Not at all. There is no inconsistency or ambiguity in the policy of the union of the democratic center or its chairman.

Suárez did not speak out against the blocs, but against the world hegemony of one of them and both of them, which is a different matter. As a European and a Spaniard, Suárez spoke out, quite rightly, against a possible future USSR-U.S. agreement which excluded the Western nations as third countries and even eliminated all those forming part of the world context.

Suárez is right: We are joining NATO because it is an alliance of democratic countries which act democratically. We can accept that SALT II, possible of course thanks to detente, was signed by the two major military

powers, but this must be the last exclusive agreement. From now on every agreement to limit weapons, whether military or conventional [as published], any agreement affecting the world's interests must be negotiated at enlarged conferences, attended on the West's behalf by the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and therefore also by France, which, of course, has its own nuclear force.

There is therefore no contradiction in being Atlanticist and antihegemonist, since what is achieved by the alliance is in fact the submitting of U.S. decisions to a European consensus. We might summarize Suarez' stance as follows: Partners, yes; dependents, no. Of course I fully endorse it, because of its worthy and patriotic nature.

As far as the nonaligned countries' conference is concerned, I have never declared myself opposed to attending it as guests, despite the fact that some newspapers may attribute such opposition to me. I am aware that "the nonaligned countries are the natural allies of the socialist community," and include such "pacifist" and "neutral" countries as Cuba, with its troops in Africa and Vietnam (I take the passage in quotation marks from a substantial article published in AUSSENPOLITIK vol 30, 2/79, p 136). Nevertheless, I can see no objection to our accepting the invitation, since it is always good to learn and to establish contacts. Spain has responsibilities and interests--even more cultural than economic--in areas of the world where there are many "nonaligned" countries. Spain should be open to the entire world, should support any peace initiative, from whatever quarter, and should cooperate in any kind of aid for the third world. We respect the nonaligned countries' particular stance, but we do hope that they will respect ours, avoiding utterances of the kind made by Fidel Castro when Suarez visited him, or by deputy speaker of the Algerian People's Assembly Yaker, when he took part in the INCI [expansion unknown] meeting in Jaca (in May of this year): "Do not join NATO," "We would be deeply concerned to see you join NATO," and similar statements.

Let the cobbler stick to his last. Or do certain nonaligned countries advise precisely what suits a certain totally aligned country?

CSO: 3110

**PSOE'S GONZALEZ ON SITUATION WITHIN PARTY, SPAIN**

Caracas RESUMEN in Spanish 12 Aug 79 pp 53-56

[Interview with PSOE leader Felipe Gonzalez by RESUMEN reporter; date and place not given]

[Text] For this Andalusian socialist, if Marx were to rise from his grave in Highgate and observe the USSR, he would cry out: Proletarians of the world, forgive me! This is the opinion of the vice president of the Socialist International whom Georges Marchais has very ambiguously and Neo-Stalinistically described as being endowed with "globally positive experience."

Quite the contrary of what he would have us believe, Felipe Gonzalez has read Marx and the Marxist writers and spoke to us about them with the same certitude any learned professor would have. "During the dictatorship there was practically nothing I could do, which is why I spent my time reading up on Marxism," such that he is well-versed on the subject. And if he has lied to us, it is because his intellectual capacity is extraordinary. It must be for him to have been able to acquire all this knowledge since last May when the last PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] congress was held, such that, without pretending to be experts on Marxism, we can listen to his informal, but sufficiently coherent explanation in which he discusses Marx, Bakunin, Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky, Lenin and Stalin, socialism, democracy, social democracy, personality cults, liberty and totalitarianism.

With this same honesty and firmness — a PSOE slogan during the last Spanish general elections — he, who in the near future might well be a Spanish prime minister, in an exclusive interview granted RESUMEN spoke about the 28th PSOE Congress, its ideological defeat, his personal victory and his virtually complete victory at the Special Congress, to be held in September. A victory of which he is certain and, while his opponents in the party are campaigning throughout Spain, he has come to America to attend the "Democracy and Liberty" trade-union conference and to be able to follow the Nicaraguan situation from nearby, one on which he urges the solidarity of the West, of the progressive West, so that, at the same time the new democracy comments on its relations with social democracy, it will have opinions on the

COPEI [Social Christian Party], the AD [Democratic Action] and the MAS [Movement for Socialism] and very calmly respond to certain accusations.

RESUMEN: The question of an absence of self-criticism in the PSOE has been raised. Is this absence of self-criticism what generated the discussions that were entered into at the 28th Congress?

Felipe Gonzalez: I don't think so. I think that the PSOE is probably the party which offers the most opportunity for internal criticism and which most indulges in it. Of all the organizations I know all over the world, I know of no party anywhere that offers its members more freedom to criticize what goes on inside the party and among its leaders or in any party agency.

RESUMEN: You have been accused of personalizing the PSOE. This apparently unjust accusation assumed a certain importance when the group led by Prof Tierno Galvan, Francisco Bustelo, Gomez Llorente and Pablo Castellanos succeeded in getting Marxist ideals accepted at the above-mentioned congress, at which, apparently to their surprise, you did not offer your candidacy for reelection, one from which you would have emerged victorious and that despite the fact that the political line that would be approved was known beforehand. So they think that you are pressuring the party with the dilemma: Marx or Felipe? Isn't this a personalist, tyrannical and anti-democratic attitude?

Felipe Gonzalez: I sincerely do not think so. The more one removes oneself from the immediate reality of the country, the more difficult it is to see what is going on inside it. So, naturally, viewed from Caracas there is too much distance from the reality of what took place at our congress which you, for example, lump together with Tierno Galvan, Bustelo, Llorente and Pablo Castellanos. If you asked each of them this same question, lumping them all together, they would probably feel somewhat offended by you because they would not want to identify themselves as all having the same political orientation. Then there is the problem posed by your accusation of my personality cult. If you follow the Spanish press as a political observer, I would refer you to it to prove that, from the 28th Congress until today, I have engaged in practically no personal battles in the party, whereas those who accuse me of fomenting a personality cult are involved in a fundamentally personal, not ideological, battle. And I am going to tell you why, in detail. At the 28th Congress a political stance was approved in which the party — I like to be very rigorous in my choice of words, which is why I am very reluctant to make statements — was defined as being Marxist. Right now there is not a single political issue, not a single one, on which the party assumes a Marxist stand. I don't know whether I have made it clear enough, but I'm going to add to what I've just said something that may perhaps interest you. For me, who has perhaps maintained a position close to Marxist theory and methodology, more than for many who claimed to be defending the Marxist point of view at the congress, Marxism is a contribution which for some may be fundamental, for others important and for still others relatively important, but which is of importance for everyone in the socialist world, both in terms of theory and of methodology. But

in addition to this contribution, there are others in the socialist world, and that is why a party should not define its position rigidly as Marxist if within its ranks it contains other contributions as well as the Marxist one. What we have to do is to recognize the theoretical and methodological contributions of Marxism. This is my position. Thus the debate is not for or against Marxism; rather it is whether a party can /rigorously/ [in italics] define itself as Marxist without wanting to fall into the temptation of turning itself into a religion like those we are witness to which exist in some countries.

RESUMEN: But why didn't you use your personal prestige before the democratic vote on a political position rather than after it, when about 80 percent of the delegates will be voting for you for secretary general?

Felipe Gonzalez: According to what the critics say, somewhat more than 80 percent. The critics say that 90 percent will vote for my position. Precisely because I am not personalist — there is where the contradictions are to be found — they accuse me of a personalism I have never practiced. What happens in politics, not only in my country but in all the countries in the world — and I would like to see you cite me a single exception — is that any political organization has two fundamental identifying marks for the public in general, for the voting population: its acronym, with all the ideological content that conjures up, and the individual who heads the political organization. If you can find me a single counterexample, I will be immediately prepared to agree with you.

RESUMEN: So the PSOE's dilemma is not a question of either social democracy or loss of popular support and consequently stagnation in the march toward assumption of power?

Felipe Gonzalez: Absolutely not. Given Spain's social, economic and political situation, a social democratic establishment like that of Northern Europe is, in my opinion, inappropriate. Ours must be a more critical, tougher kind of socialism. What is happening inside the socialist movement is that there exists a representative spectrum that runs from critical Marxism to social democracy with humanistic or anthropological movements somewhere in between.

RESUMEN: What role has the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] played in all this?

Felipe Gonzalez: I think that, fortunately, it has played no role and hopefully it will continue to play no sort of role because this is not its problem.

RESUMEN: With reference to Prof Tierno Galvan, they say that his speech delivered at the 28th Congress was "highly Marxist in content." What interest do the mayor of Madrid and his faction have in this debate?

Felipe Gonzalez: I think that Prof Tierno Galvan's speech as mayor of Madrid and honorary congress chairman was nothing more than a welcoming address and I think that, in order to form an opinion of the importance of speeches, the best thing one can do is to read them, to quote them. There was my own, made at the opening of the congress, in which I believe there was a critical analysis of the Marxist contribution that might be situated among the lesser analyses made at the congress. In any event, something that seems very important to me is that not a single one of the positions presented during the Special Congress exceeds the bounds of the analysis I made at the start of the congress.

RESUMEN: You have said that there is no one in the PSOE who is to the left or to the right of you. Is this attitude compatible with the breadth of scope and internal democracy that should be characteristic of a socialist party and with the ideas you publicly advocate?

Felipe Gonzalez: No, that is not exactly what I said. I said that the role of a political leader in the party — and I, who have been one, have tried to act accordingly — is to coordinate the views that coexist in the party, not to speak out in favor of one of these views.

RESUMEN: In itself, discussion over official party doctrine appears to be narrow, Byzantine and even irrelevant. Shifting the discussion to the field of Venezuelan politics, mutatis mutandis, the undersecretary general of Venezuela's chief socialist party, Teodoro Petkoff, who calls himself a Marxist, last December said: "...Marxism is not the official doctrine of the movement because the MAS has no official doctrine... any MAS member can tackle a given political issue as a theoretical instrument of another kind; that is, no one can stop an MAS sociologist from making use of what in the field of sociology is referred to as functionalism..." Nevertheless, what has happened in the PSOE because of Petkoff's statements has apparently not happened in the MAS and, in any event, the PSOE's theoretical and programmatic content, its historic course of action and most of the positions adopted during the May congress are revolutionary in nature. If at the September Special Congress his positions are again rejected but his candidacy for the office of secretary general is once again accepted, how will you feel about it?

Felipe Gonzalez: The question has gotten a bit complicated in the course of the analysis. I would say to you that the debate for or against Marxism is not as relevant as it is claimed to be. In that respect, you are right. I would also say to you that, if a socialist party is rigorous, if it is minimally critical and honest, it cannot call itself Marxist. But I repeat that the problem of defining oneself or not is not a question of alienating or not alienating oneself from the theoretical and methodological contribution of Marxism. That is to say that I am not ready to allow myself to be subjected to the cliche of being for or against Marxism because I believe that neither Marx nor his disciples were dogmatic and that there are fundamental contributions needed to establish a socialist program. Consequently, I am not going to give up these contributions and will therefore not enter

into the debate in the sclerotized terms it has been presented which presuppose one's being for or against Marxism because that seems to me to be true political stupidity. Marxism has its importance in the socialist scheme of things and no one can deny that importance. What is in fact the case is that we can be neither dogmatic nor exclusive. So, the political resolutions adopted by a congress are resolutions that should be applied by the leaders. Now, the leaders, who are not sacred cows but members of a party, have to know how to accept being in the majority and, when they are in the minority, they have to be honest enough to say: It is up to the majority faction to direct the political life of the party. There are some who do not want to understand this because what interests them is being on the throne, at the controls, and they are not interested in adapting themselves and bowing to the will of the party majority when they are in the minority. I do not defend the throne. I am accused of creating a personality cult, but I notice that many of those taking part in the debate are infinitely more personalist than I.

RESUMEN: Why are they conducting a party-internal campaign throughout Spain?

Felipe Gonzalez: No, not for that reason. That seems to me to be perfectly noble and perfectly logical. Not for that reason, but because now, curiously enough, they accuse me of not having raised my personal banner, saying: This is my political position. They accuse me of this, they who on the 20 May, believing they were creating a political strategy, thought what you said in your earlier question: That I would raise my personal banner to flatten my opponents and return to the party leadership with a lot more power. That is, the big surprise is that the only thing I have done is to expectantly look on and participate as just one more member in the great debate on the socialists' mission in the Spanish society of today, the debate on the socialist program. However, I have raised no personal banner. Now, look for yourself among any of the events that have occurred and see whether so-and-so's or so-and-so's personal banner was raised. You will not find mine among them.

RESUMEN: PSOE Senator for Madrid Francisco Bustelo claims that if you and your followers clarify your political program — in view of the fact that an important political debate has begun which deals with the coming Special Congress — they will support it. However, Bustelo says that the "rightist press has praised you with suspicious unanimity." What do you have to say to us about this?

Felipe Gonzalez: Yes, it is true that they have borrowed an idea from old Bebel, the old German socialist, when he had mounted the podium of the German congress and his opponents were applauding him after one of his speeches and he said: "What could you have said, old Bebel? Where could you have erred such that your friends are applauding you?"

But that is a hoary old trick and I'm going to tell you why. In the party, just as in all leftist parties, there are some factions that always describe

the press as "the bourgeois press" because the means of power of the immense majority of the communications media are, as you must very well know, in the hands of the right. Nevertheless, this contemptuous appellation, "bourgeois press," is incompatible with the attitudes of every one of these people who want the bourgeois press to give them space to make statements and publish their theories. The great tragedy is that they prefer to make use of the bourgeois press, but when there is an analysis in this press that they do not like, they use it to claim that the bourgeois press is supporting another view and then this other one is wrong. It is a lamentable kind of word play and I think a big mistake because they ought to add to that line from Bebel a very appropriate reflection by Machado: "If you want to win a war, you have to have the smallest possible number of enemies."

RESUMEN: On Sunday, 22 July 1979, the Madrid Socialist Labor-Union Assembly was held in Madrid to choose the position it would support at the PSOE Special Congress. A moderate position was defeated at the assembly and people say that the critical faction's victory may have widespread repercussions among other labor unions. What prospects do you envisage for its political line at the coming PSOE Special Congress?

Felipe Gonzalez: Well, you see, they are playing with words too much. The position adopted last weekend in Madrid, which was approved by a majority coalition of various party factions, is one that is in almost total agreement with what I had said in the inaugural address at the 28th Congress. In that address, I proposed that we have to focus our attention on the party's ideological problem. Nevertheless, they go on implementing their plans, fundamentally personalist plans. If so-and-so defends something, it turns out that that is more radical, such that words begin to lose their meaning, are turned into empty concepts and are deprived of the nobility of their content. For example, they talk of radicals and moderates. The word "radical" means going to the roots of problems and what those who ideologize the debate do is precisely the opposite. They fall into the trap that Marx so harshly described when he said: "Ideology (when it is divorced from reality) is frequently the demagogic refuge of incompetents." Therefore, I feel that we have to reestablish the value of words. On several occasions, I have said that I believe that there are few people in the party more radical than I, in the deepest sense of the word, and being "radical" is not incompatible with being "moderate." In conclusion, I would like to end this interview by saying something important. It seems to me that in politics it is a basic axiom for a party or a person — the same applies to either — to do as it says it will, to promise only what it is prepared to do. As soon as a political speech deviates from what one is concretely prepared to do, it is cheating the people and is consequently acting dishonestly in terms of its political action and I am incapable of acting in this way.

RESUMEN: Getting back to the Venezuelan political arena, the AD Party, with which you have ties, has assumed more conservative and reactionary positions. During last year's election campaign, then candidate Pinerua Ordaz confessed to Praga that he was antileft and anticommunist. He also resorted to tactics of ideological terrorism in alerting voters on the supposedly communist

content of the ideas propagated by the COPEI and its candidate and the notion of community property. Now nothing could be more untrue than that because the COPEI, at least until now, has always been a center-right party. Venezuelans have never understood why you presented Luis Pinerua before the television cameras as the Venezuelan socialist candidate.

Felipe Gonzalez: When did I present him?

RESUMEN: At least that's what some press commentaries reported.

Felipe Gonzalez: You have made a value judgment on the AD which, naturally, I am not prepared to share, just as I am not prepared to pass critical judgment on what went on in Venezuela or is going on in Venezuela at this time, from the standpoint of the platform you propose to me. I have relations with the AD, very good ones, through the Socialist International. What is happening is that every country has a choice between a progressive power and another one, less progressive or conservative. In this country, you have to tell me what the progressive power alternative is as far as the COPEI is concerned. If you tell me that it is not the AD but some other group, let's begin to talk; but if there is no other one but the AD opposing the COPEI, which is the preserver of European political parameters, then let's not. Nor do I want to begin to analyze the accusations that have been leveled at the COPEI, the alliances we could call peculiar with groups that are antagonists of the AD but which do not adhere to its political philosophy nor to its political practice.

RESUMEN: What is your opinion of the MAS socialist program?

Felipe Gonzalez: Well, I think that the MAS is a socialist party, as you have just said. I have had contacts with them often enough in the past and I think I'm going to see them again, going to come back to Venezuela, probably soon, and I'm going to see them again and talk with them. I think the MAS has achieved something through the elections; that is, it has gained a certain measure of credibility among the people. Now, I don't know what it is based on but I do know how important it is. In short, when one is a democrat, it is very important to know what the public's reaction to a given political stance is, the degree to which it is accepted and the public support it has. Democracy or socialism can only be developed with a majority program, never with a minority program. I respect the MAS, as I do all political forces and usually when I come to Latin America I am in contact with leftist political forces, although sometimes it is somewhat hard for me to do so, but not exactly in Venezuela.

RESUMEN: Now let's talk a little about Nicaragua. In comparing the Venezuelan 23 January with the Sandinist victory, we maintain that the two processes are substantially different from one another since in Venezuela dictator Perez Jimenez did not succeed in gaining personal control over the armed forces, which rose up with the people and the class of employers and businessmen and the dictatorship was overthrown. But there were still fascist and Perez Jimenez elements within the armed forces, whose

institutional organization — aside from the security services — did not undergo any major modifications. And furthermore, the radical left was excluded from the debate and especially later, encouraged, aided and armed by the Cuban revolution, it chose the path of insurrection. The fact is that in Venezuela we have democracy, but obviously there has been no revolution. On the other hand, in Nicaragua the case is different. Since it had served as Somoza's bodyguard and as an army of occupation, the GN [National Guard] fled the country in rout when the dictator was overthrown and the promises the Sandinists had made to the effect that the new army would be composed of both Sandinists and elements of the former GN who had not committed crimes against the people and had not engaged in corruption could not be carried out. But in the case of Nicaragua, "right from the start" of the struggle the Sandinists had adopted the banners of pluralism and democracy. Felipe Gonzalez, what can you say to us about the Nicaraguan situation?

Felipe Gonzalez: I hope that Nicaragua will become a country with a progressive democracy as we understand the term. In conclusion, I would say to you that socialism is nothing more than the permanent establishment of the concept of democracy. While democracy is not limited to politics, if there is no political democracy, there can be no other kind of democracy, neither economic nor any other kind. Then we have totalitarianism. Therefore, I feel that Nicaragua now has a wonderful opportunity to go beyond the borders of political democracy, extending it to other domains, but without losing political democracy. That is, to advance toward economic democracy, toward social democracy, toward cultural democracy. Everything depends on a number of factors, among others one very important one: that they do not confuse themselves with Western progressive parties and movements, that they do not make this mistake and that they do not close their doors on solidarity, rather, quite the contrary, that they increase solidarity so that Nicaraguans can get over the critical phase, the dramatic phase of economic disaster, poverty and shortages they are now going through to enable themselves to achieve a minimally ordered reconstruction of everything that has been destroyed by Somoza rule and the war against Somoza.

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## CEAUSESCU, ECEVIT DISCUSS BILATERAL RELATIONS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 18 Aug 79 p 4

[Text] Ankara: Returning from an official visit to Syria, Romanian Head of State Ceausescu visited Ankara and spoke with Prime Minister Ecevit for two hours. It was reported that during the meeting, accord had been reached for a transition to joint production in certain fields, to be brought about by combining the resources of the two nations; that agreement had been reached on the topic of devoting greater efforts to disarmament; that the development of intra-Balkan relations had been stressed; and that in addition a decision had been reached to practice cooperation in matters regarding Third World nations.

Ceausescu's Statement

In a statement made following the discussions, Romanian Head of State Ceausescu said that he was pleased at the positive development of relations between the two countries, reporting that, particularly in recent years, economic relations between Romania and Turkey have registered great progress. Noting that bilateral relations and international problems had been emphasized in his talk with Prime Minister Ecevit, Ceausescu stated that possibilities for both joint production and for cooperation with Third World nations were perceived as existing in the years to come.

Ceausescu noted that experts from the two countries would meet together in the near future in order to study these matters and reported that these issues would be dealt with during the visit which the Romanian Prime Minister would soon be making to Turkey. Revealing that international affairs had also been discussed during the talk, Ceausescu stated that agreement had been reached on the necessity of preparations by the two nations for the "Conference on Cooperation for European Security" to be held in Madrid in 1980; he also stated that they had exchanged views concerning the necessity that the Cyprus problem be resolved by negotiations.

### Ecevit's Statement

Prime Minister Ecevit reported that the talks had been useful, continuing as follows:

"In our conversation today, we discussed both international and interregional matters. The cooperation between our two nations is rapidly progressing. Our government has made significant contributions to this progress.

"For some time, Mr. Ceausescu has made great contributions to Turkish-Romanian relations. Romania is one of the nations with which Turkey's trade relations have developed most rapidly during the past year and a half.

"Agreement was reached for a transition to joint production in certain fields, to be brought about by combining the resources of the two nations. Experts from both nations will meet together and discuss the dimensions of this co-operation. In addition, we agreed upon cooperation with regard to Third World nations. The forms of cooperation which our nations will practice in the field of international transport were established. Agreement was reached concerning the possibilities of increased benefit to be obtained by partnership in the field of international transport on the Black Sea. Meanwhile, it was obvious that the views of Turkey and Romania concerning international affairs exhibit great similarity. We agreed that it would be beneficial for the foreign ministers of the two nations to meet in discussions prior to the convening of the conference on European security. In general, we perceived that our views with regard to a cessation of the world armaments race and the development of a new economic order are very similar. We also observed that relations among the Balkan nations are making continued progress."

Prime Minister Ecevit stated that, in his conversation with Ceausescu, he had provided information concerning Turkish - Greek relations as seen after his talks with Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, and that he had informed him that a solution could be found to the problems if the dialogue between Turkey and Greece were continued. He also stated that the problems of the Middle East had been assessed, that this had been helpful, and that, in conjunction with the Palestinian issue, "We discussed the fact that a solution which does not provide for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their right to establish a state would not be realistic, and we found that our views on this matter were quite close." Ecevit also said that he had informed the Romanian Head of State that it was an encouraging period for the resumption of intercommunal talks on Cyprus.

Minister of State and Assistant Prime Minister Hikmet Cetin and Romanian Assistant Prime Minister Opreau were also present at the Ecevit - Ceausescu discussion; at the same time, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gunduz Okcun and Romanian Foreign Minister Stephen Andrei were engaged in discussion in a separate room.

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CSO: 4907

## 'MILLIYET,' 'CUMHURIYET' VIEW NEW RELATIONS WITH PLO FAVORABLY

## 'MILLIYET' Report

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 10 Aug 79 pp 1, 12

[Text] The first curtain came down on a happy ending for Turkey following a bloody act which put the world through days of fear and anxiety, and the second act has ended as expected. New announcements indicate that the Palestine Liberation Organization will open a representation in Ankara in the weeks ahead.

This is a significant development, not from the standpoint of relations between Turkey and the Palestinian Arabs, but from the standpoint of the latest image the PLO is trying to create for itself. The PLO, which for some time has been officially seated at the United Nations, is trying to have itself widely recognized as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people.

Representatives of legal rights are powers which must first comply with specific laws themselves. As was pointed out in the discussions which PLO leader Arafat held in Vienna with Brandt and Kreisky just prior to the bloody raid on the Egyptian embassy in Ankara, the PLO summarizes the image it has adopted as follows:

The PLO is not a terrorist organization, it is a political organization. So it must be...

The same principles lie at the root of the understanding reached between Ankara and the PLO.

In fact, the reasons for carrying out a decision which had been made even during the time of the Demirel governments only after a delay of several years may be explained by the suspicions and arguments about the nature of the PLO:

According to some circles, as the PLO is still a "terrorist organization," an office to be opened in Turkey can be expected to end up supporting terrorist activities inside the country.

The announcements by organization official Abu Firas, who conducted the talks in Ankara with Prime Minister Ecevit and Foreign Minister Okcun on behalf of the PLO, are interesting from this angle. As an extension of the "confidence-inspiring image" which it is trying to create worldwide, the PLO points out that its field of action is limited by its goal "to liberate the land under occupation." And for this reason, "the PLO rejects interference in the internal affairs of nations."

The meaning of this statement is that, in exchange for the right to be represented in Turkey, the PLO wanted to give Ankara a "guarantee" that it would not establish direct relations with activist groups in the country.

It is known also that another matter which overshadows relations between the PLO and Turkey is the Cyprus problem. That the PLO, which on one hand defends Cyprus' need to remain independent and nonaligned, should then pose blindness to the Greek Cypriot segments known to be pursuing union with Greece on the other hand generally strikes Turkish public opinion as odd behavior.

What should be watched with interest after this is what kind of attitude the PLO will gradually adopt toward the Turkish Cypriots, who desire equal rights on Cyprus and life within true security. We must not forget that there is a Turkish community on Cyprus which for a long time has suffered efforts to deprive it of all rights. As for their problems, as the resolutions adopted at the Lusaka Conference just yesterday clearly confirm, they ought to be a great deal better known, especially by the nations which follow the nonalignment policy.

It is hoped that the PLO Ankara representation, which reportedly will have "full diplomatic status," will result in a positive contribution, remote from any prejudice, to the Near East, which needs the establishment of peaceful dialogues. Ankara is a capital city which is always open, especially to constructive cooperation to prove suspicions wrong.

'CUMHURIYET' View

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 9 Aug 79 p 9

[Text] With the protocol initiated last Saturday by Deputy Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry and Abu Firas after 5 days of negotiations, the final stage was reached in the opening of a PLO representation which had long seemed to be a story without an end. The protocol will go into effect and the mission will be opened when the protocol is signed by Foreign Minister Professor Okcun and PLO Political Department Chief Faruk Khaddumi, who will soon visit Ankara. The opening of the representation will be the first time that a representative of "a state without a country" will join the diplomatic missions in Ankara.

### From 1974 to 1979

The line followed by relations between Turkey and the PLO have a different tone from the discussions of the period in 1974 when high-level contacts were made between Foreign Minister Professor Turan Gunes and Faruk Khaddumi. Despite the frequent reference to "historical ties of brotherhood," a true climate of confidence between Turkey and the PLO just emerged not long ago at the time of the Islamic Conference in Morocco.

The Turkish government's announcement in 1974 of its decision to allow a PLO mission and the failure to realize it until now despite its having been the subject of a joint communique in 1977 had led to the appearance of a negative attitude on the PLO front. Actually, a "confidential" report on the subject prepared at the Foreign Ministry back in 1974 contained a positive view toward the opening of a PLO representation.

### Turning Point

These difficulties were largely overcome in the Professor Okcun-Khaddumi talks in Morocco. According to Foreign Ministry authorities, the Morocco meeting was a turning point in relations between Turkey and the PLO. Although the talks came to a serious standstill at one point, the rough spots were worked out as the result of efforts by certain Turkish diplomats and PLO officials, and Okcun and Khaddumi came out of a meeting lasting past midnight with a full unity of views.

Following the Okcun-Khaddumi talks, the PLO abstained for the first time in voting on the draft resolution on Cyprus which is always couched in terms supportive of the Turkish views at the Islamic Conference. This act is the first clear indication of a change in policy on the Cyprus problem by the PLO, which until now has supported the Greek Cypriot side and has constantly iterated this support on international platforms.

The first bloodless conclusion of an incident in the history of international terrorism may have been possible thanks to Turkish-PLO cooperation at the time of the raid on the Egyptian embassy in Ankara after the Morocco rapprochement, and the Ankara incident strengthened the emerging climate of confidence in Turkish-PLO relations.

### Turn-Around in Turkish Foreign Policy

Diplomatic sources in Ankara say that with the opening of the PLO representation, one of the important requirements for a multi-directional foreign policy will have been met. According to these sources, with the opening of the representation, Turkish-PLO relations will rest on a political foundation and Turkey's stance in support of the Palestinian cause will gain concrete form. The opening of the PLO representation symbolizes an important turn-around in Turkish foreign policy.

**TURK-IS OFFICIAL CALLS FOR 'SOCIAL CONTRACT'S' RENEGOTIATION**

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 12 Aug 79 p 8

[Text] Izmir, Turkish News Agency -- Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] Region 3 Representative Ertugrul Bulmanis maintains that the government has failed this year to fulfill the social contract it reached with Turk-Is last year and said, "The Social Contract must be reviewed by government authorities, and changes must be made in accordance with present conditions."

Interviewed by a Turkish News Agency correspondent following the decision by Turk-Is-affiliated unions in various public establishments to oppose the principle of conducting collective agreements in accordance with the Social Contract concluded with this confederation earlier and to go on strike, Turk-Is Region 3 Representative Bulmanis maintained that Turk-Is to date had been very careful to comply with the Social Contract in even the tiniest details.

Stressing that they had been faithful to the Social Contract to date because of the economic and political instability in the country, Bulmanis expressed the following views, in summary:

"Moreover, it had been set forth in the Social Contract that price increases would be slowed down, that changes would be made in the tax laws so that workers and laborers would not be burdened economically and that measures like this would be taken."

Pointing out that "neither the economic articles of the Social Contract nor the articles of principle was viable for today and that the Social Contract had lost all value," Bulmanis suggested that, for these reasons, the Social Contract should be reviewed in its entirety by the government authorities and the necessary changes made in accordance with present conditions.

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**ERBAKAN URGES DEFENSE ORGANIZATION FOR ISLAMIC NATIONS**

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 12 Aug 79 p 7

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET Bureau) -- NSP [National Salvation Party] General Chairman Prof Necmettin Erbakan, knocking at a press conference yesterday what he called a special army geared to conditions in the Middle East formed by the United States in order to block uprisings of Islamic nations and to guarantee its oil needs, proposed that the Islamic nations form a NATO-like defense organization among themselves.

Professor Erbakan stated that the United States was using the dollar to exploit the oil-producing Islamic nations and, referring to the European nations' attempt to develop a monetary unit among themselves to compete with the dollar, said that the Islamic nations should likewise initiate an "Islamic dinar" system.

In answer to a question about why oil producing nations such as Saudi Arabia invest their petroleum income in European and U.S. banks, the NSP leader said, "Because the United States threatens them so they will sell it their oil, it says, 'I will declare war,' it sets up a special army, and Wall Street manages this." Erbakan said, "Although oil is \$20 per barrel, the United States pays \$35. That is easy for them. They just change a system of the paper machine and print \$35, because they pay for oil in paper."

Professor Erbakan explained that the Islamic nations are undergoing a great awakening and proposed that these nations establish among themselves an "Islamic Nations United Nations Organization," an "Islamic Nations Common Market," an "Islamic Nations Common Defense Organization" and an "Islamic Nations Cultural and Research Organization."

Stating that he had been received by Saudi Arabian King Melik Khalid 'Abd al-'Aziz, Professor Erbakan said the king had told him that "he derived great satisfaction from Turkey's daily increase in cooperation with the Islamic nations."

## ERBAKAN SANCTIONS IDEA OF TFSC UDI

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 21 Jul 79 p 8

[Excerpt] Ankara (Special) -- NSP [National Salvation Party] General Chairman Necmettin Erbakan said that Cyprus has been suffering various afflictions for 5 years because of the failure to declare independence in Cyprus immediately after the peace operation. "The sooner independence is declared in Cyprus," he said, "the sooner the Cyprus problem will be resolved."

In a press conference at party headquarters yesterday, Erbakan recalled that the operation had been carried out 5 years ago for the purpose of putting an end to the oppression and pressure on our brothers in Cyprus and maintained that this decision had been made with NSP concurrence. He defended the decision as an important one, which "only a mentality representative of the nation and its history could take." He continued:

"The attitude adopted by the foreign powers in the 5 years since the Cyprus peace operation is remarkable. Instead of thanking us, the foreign powers used this as a pretext for an arms embargo, and seeing that this was not sufficient, then proceeded with an economic and financial embargo. In the days following the operation, the NSP called for the initiation of a drive for heavy industry in order that this military victory might be sustained with economic victories and had a large historical wall map of the drive for heavy industry drawn up at the prime minister's office. This call we made is very meaningful to those with insight. It was a premonition of the embargoes to come.

"If we had begun the drive for heavy industry in 1974, it would be 80 percent realized by now, and we would have had no foreign exchange squeeze, no diesel fuel crunch, no shortages, no doing without. Upon our announcement that we were beginning this drive, the foreign powers went into action and through various means of influence brought down the government of that time. Then they had the elections moved up. The only goal of the elections was to have a government without the NSP. But it was a Pyrrhic victory; the keys once again were passed to the NSP. Then the foreign powers chose the route of obtaining what they could not achieve through elections by resorting to antidemocratic intrigues and managed to bring about a change of government by the artifice of tricking 11 persons into switching from the Justice Party to the other side. For 18 months now, our nation has suffered the consequences of this chicanery."

Erbakan maintained that the way to resolve the Cyprus problem was independence in Cyprus and that, if independence were declared, almost 50 Muslim nations would recognize Cyprus and the problem would finally be solved.

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COUNTRY SECTION

UNITED KINGDOM

BRIEFS

EEC-USSR BUTTER DEAL--Russia is poised to pull off another cut-price butter coup at the Common Market taxpayers' expense, according to well-informed European dairy industry sources. They believe the stage is being set for Russia to buy about 75,000 tons of butter from France this winter at one-third the EEC price, with the aid of a huge export subsidy paid by the Common Market of 1,140 pounds sterling a ton, nearly 52 pence a pound. The deal will cost the community's farm budget, which accounts for 70 percent of all EEC spending, about 85.5 million pounds sterling in export subsidies. A big sale of Common Market butter to Russia could create a shortage of freshly made EEC butter this winter, because it is freshly made butter rather than old stocks that has been in the EEC's "intervention" cold stores for months, or maybe years, that the Russians want. More seriously, it could provide Common Market agricultural ministers at their Brussels meeting in a fortnight's time with a ready excuse to put off yet again taking decisions on radical measures to bring European dairy surpluses under control. [Excerpts] [London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English  
3 Sep 79 p 4 LD]

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